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This article has two principal objectives: to briefly summarize
Connecticut laws of unauthorized law practice and to set forth many of the
options available to Connecticut lawmakers for revising or clarifying the
state's unauthorized practice laws. In many important respects Connecticut
unauthorized practice laws are unduly ambiguous, uncertain, and much in
need of clarification. Also. some Connecticut unauthorized practice laws
are clear and certain probably should be revised, better adapted to current
needs. including exclusion from the legal services' market those providers
who it now appears are unqualified or untrustworthy. Unauthorized prac-
tice laws are essential to our legal order as they largely determine who may
provide legal services and to whom. Given their significance. it is particu-
larly important that these laws be clear, complete. and up-to-date in meet-
ing contemporary needs.
Part I of this article summarizes existing Connecticut unauthorized
practice laws; Part II describes many of the options available for amplify-
ing and revising those laws; and Part III adds some concluding remarks.
Most of the options considered have been adopted as law in one or more
•Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor of Law Emeritus, Yale Law School. The author is a former presi-
dent of the Connecticut Bar Foundation, as well as a long-time member of the Connecticut Bar Asso-
ciation's Ethics Committee and Unauthorized Practice Committee. Although the author has ascertained
some of the information presented in this Article through his participation in the work of the Connecti-
cut Bar Association, the viewpoints set forth in this Article are those of the author and he is not acting
as a representative of the Connecticut Bar Association or any of its committees in expressing them.
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other states and as such may be particularly valuable law reform guides.
The objective in setting out these options is not to tell Connecticut law-
makers what they should do but to suggest possibilities for action by them.
It is urged, however, that Connecticut lawmakers take action in the near
term to amplify and modernize this important field oflaw. The law reform
process also would be aided by the Connecticut courts, as soon as possible,
unequivocally declaring what is the exact scope of their constitutional
power over the unauthorized practice of law relative to the other two
branches of government. Doubts over this issue add to the uncertainty in
the state's unauthorized practice laws and to the uncertainty as to which
lawmakers have ultimate responsibility for reforming those laws.
Determining just what reforms should be made in a state's unauthor-
ized practice laws is not an easy undertaking. The subject is highly contro-
versial, there are powerful interest groups with opposing views on most
reform proposals, and there are many possible variables as to where lines
should be drawn between the permissible and impermissible. But Con-
necticut lawmakers have been delinquent in not modernizing this important
field of law and action by them is overdue.
I. CONNECTICUT LAWS ON THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
A Statutes
The Connecticut statutes as to who may and may not practice law con-
sist of a basic statutory section, section 51-88, that restricts such practice to
attorneys admitted to practice law in Connecticut, I and a scattering of
statutory provisions setting forth exceptions and qualifications to the gen-
eral restriction of law practice to admitted Connecticut attorneys. No Con-
necticut statute, however, defines the practice of law. Most statutory ex-
ception and qualification provisions pertain to judges and court officials.
For example, judges of the superior, appellate and supreme courts of the
state shall not engage in private law practice.2 Also, some restrictions on
the practice of law are imposed on probate judges,3 partners and associates
I CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-88 (2003). An additional statutory section prohibits a nonattomey from
soliciting another person to institute an action for damages if the solicitor receives compensation from
the solicited person or that person's lawyer. [d. Unlike section 51-88, this section has rarely been
considered in reported judicial opinions. But see Robertson v. Town of Stonington, 253 Conn. 255,
256-57,750 A.2d 460, 461-62 (2000) (holding that a property owner was not barred from appealing a
property tax assessment because he had contracted with a nonattomey to challenge the assessment, a
contract that allegedly violated section 51-86, however the alleged invalidity of the contract was con-
sidered irrelevant to the taxpayer's right to appeal the tax assessment).
On the earlier history ofConnecticut statutes prohibiting the practice of law by persons not admit-
ted to practice law in Connecticut, see Grievance Committee v. Dacey, 154 Conn. 129, 137-40,222
A.2d 339, 344-45 (1966).
2 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-47(c) (2003).
3 Probate judges shall not appear in a contested matter in probate court. [d. § 45a-25.
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of probate judges,4 retired judges,S state marshals and constables,6 and su-
perior court clerks.' There are, however, some statutory exceptions to pro-
hibitions on practice of law. A pro se exception exists that pennits any
person to practice law or plead at the bar of any Connecticut court in the
person's own cause,8 certain legal documents may be prepared by town
clerks,9 any person may act as an agent or representative for a party in an
international arbitration,IO and certain court clerks for housing matters may
provide assistance to pro se litigants. II
Violation of section 51-88 is a crime and violators are deemed in con-
tempt of court. 12 Exempt from this criminal provision are house counselor
other attorney employees of business entities not admitted to practice law
in Connecticut but admitted elsewhere in the United States. If these attor-
neys are employed in Connecticut and render legal services to their em-
ployer within the scope of their employment, they are not subject to the
criminal sanctions of section 51-88. 13 A similar exemption does not exist
for these attorneys as to contempt or restraining order sanctions, as section
51-88 states that anyone violating any provision of section 51-88 is deemed
to be in contempt of court and may be restrained by the superior court on
petition of any member of the Connecticut bar in good standing or on the
court's own motion. 14
B. Court Rules
A number of different rules of the Connecticut Superior Court pennit
or prohibit the practice of law by particular categories of persons. Most of
these rules are concerned with the law practice rights of attorneys or
judges. There is no broad court rule, comparable in coverage to section 51-
88(a) of the General Statutes of Connecticut, that generally prohibits the
practice of law by persons not admitted to practice law in Connecticut.
Nor is there any court rule that defines the practice of law or the unauthor-
ized practice oflaw.
Attorneys from other states not admitted in Connecticut may, by a
4 A partner or associate of a probate judge cannot practice in the court of probate in which the
judge holds office. Id. § 45a-26.
S Retired judges assigned judicial duties shall not engage in private practice. Id. § 51-50k.
6 "No state marshal or constable shall appear in court as attorney." /d. § 51-89.
, Superior court clerks may not engage in the private practice of criminal law. Id. § 51-57(c).
8 Id. § 51.88(d).
9 Id.
10 Id.
1\ Id. § 51.52(d) (stating that "(e)ach clerk for housing matters and the clerks for the judicial dis-
trict of New Haven at Meriden ... shan provide assistance to pro se litigants....").
12 Id. § 51-88(b), (c).
13 Id. § 51.88(b).
14
/d. § 51·88(c).
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court rule, be admitted pro hac vice for a particular case and generally this
authorization is by the judge before whom the case is to be heard. IS But
admission is in the discretion of the court, it may be granted only on spe-
cial and infrequent occasions and for good cause shown, and a member of
the Connecticut bar must work closely with the out-of-state attorney and be
responsible for the conduct of the cause. 16 Other Connecticut court rules
permit qualifying attorneys admitted in other U.S. states, territories or the
District of Columbia to become licensed members of the Connecticut bar
by admission on motion and without taking the Connecticut bar examina-
tion. 17 But the restrictions on qualification for this type of admission are
such as to exclude out-of-state attorneys expecting to engage in only occa-
sionallaw practice activities in Connecticut.18 Admission on motion also is
a slow process that can take some months to complete, it is not available to
attorneys who have not been engaged in law practice for some years,19 and
there is a reciprocity provision that excludes attorneys from some states
from qualifying.20 Other court rules permit a qualified foreign attorney to
be licensed by the superior court as a foreign legal consultant to advise
Connecticut clients on the law of the foreign country in which the consult-
ant is admitted to practice law.21 Also, pursuant to court rules, most law
students may qualify as legal interns to perform legal services for others if
properly supervised by a member of the Connecticut bar.22 These student
IS CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-16. This rule and all other Connecticut superior court civil rules are
included in Comm'n on Official Legal Publ'ns, Official Connecticut Practice Book (2003) and in I
Wesley W. Horton & Kimberly A. Knox, Connecticut Practice Series: Practice Book Annotated (West
2003). The Practice Book also includes the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Code of Judicial
Conduct as adopted in Connecticut, both of which are rules of the Connecticut Superior Court.
It has been held that Connecticut Superior Court Rule section 2-16 does not violate the Federal
Constitution. Silverman v. Browning, 414 F. Supp. 80,88 (D. Conn. 1976) (holding that state courts
"possess the inherent power to regulate who shall practice law before them .... Absent proof of preju-
dice or abuse of discretion, the state courts must be presumed to act in good faith and with judicial
wisdom, and must be permitted to exercise their regulatory powers freely.").
16
CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-16.
17
[d. §§ 2-13 to 2-15.
18 [d. § 2-13 (stating that an applicant must intend on "a continuing basis, to practice law actively
in Connecticut and to devote the major portion of his or her working time to the practice of law in
Connecticut").
19 [d. (requiring that to qualify for admission on motion, an applicant must have "lawfully en-
gaged in the practice of law as the applicant's principal means of livelihood ... for at least five of the
seven years immediately preceding the date of the application and is in good standing").
20 [d. (stating that the applicant must be a member of a bar that ''would admit a member of the bar
of Connecticut to its bar without examination under provisions similar to those set out in this section").
21 [d. §§ 2-17 102-19. A statute expressly permits judges of the superior court to make rules
regulating foreign legal consultants. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-80a (2003). There currently are no li-
censed foreign legal consultants in Connecticut. E-mail from Howard Emond, Deputy Director, Con-
necticut Bar Examining Committee, to the Connecticut Law Review (Oct. 27, 2003, 08:13 EST) (on
file with the Connecticut Law Review).
22 CONN. SUPER. CT. R. §§ 3-14 to 3-21.
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legal interns, with requisite approval, may make appearances before a court
or administrative tribunal on behalf of a client,23 In addition they may pre-
pare pleadings, briefs, abstracts and other legal documents.24
There also are Connecticut court rules that prohibit or restrict the prac-
tice of law or provision of legal services by Connecticut judges and gov-
ernment attorneys, One such rule prohibits a judge of the state's supreme
court, appellate court or superior court from practicing law in any state or
federal court.2S The superior court judges have also adopted an amended
version of the American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Con-
duct with revisions stating that "[a] judge shall not practice law..26 and add-
ing that all full-time judges and those family support magistrates appointed
pursuant to section 46b-231 (f) of the General Statutes of Connecticut shall
comply with the Code.27 Another court rule prohibits full-time public de-
fenders and full-time state's attorneys from engaging in the private practice
of law.28 Court rule restrictions on practicing law also are imposed on
court clerks29 and on state's attorneys, assistant state's attorneys and their
law firm partners and associates,30 In addition, there are court rules that
prohibit the practice of law by lawyers placed on inactive status because of
mental incompetency or involuntary commitment to a mental hospita1.3\
And retired lawyers, who have elected not to pay the annual Connecticut
occupational tax on lawyers, may not practice law.32
The ABA model rules, that with revisions have been adopted as rules
of court by the Connecticut superior court judges, are the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.33 The Connecticut version of these rules includes prohibi-
tions on Connecticut lawyers engaging in the unauthorized practice of
23 Id. § 3-14.
24
Id. § 3-17(c).
2S Id. § 2-66(a).
26 Compare CONN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(f) (2003) (slating that "[a) judge
should not practice law"). with MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4G (2000) (stating that "[a]
judge shan not practice law"). The Connecticut Code also provides that a judge should not act as an
arbitrator or mediator, other than in court annexed alternate dispute resolution programs. CONN. CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(e) (2003).
27 CONN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT. Compliance with the Code of Judicial Conduct (compli-
ance statement at the end of the Code).
28 CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-66(b). Public defenders also are prohibited from appearing on behalf
of the slate in any criminal case. Id. § 2-66(e).
29 Id. § 2-66(d) (stating that a fun-time court clerk shall not "appear as counsel in any civil or
criminal case in any state or federal court" but ''may otherwise [practice law] as permitted by estab-
lished judicial branch policy").
30 These attorneys are prohibited from appearing "in any criminal case in behalf of any accused in
any state or federal court." Id. § 2-66(c).
3\ Id. §§ 2-56 to 57.
32
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-8Ib(g) (2003); CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-55
33 I HORTON & KNox, supra note 15, at 3-4 (discussing the history of the Connecticut Rules of
Professional Conduct).
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law34 or assisting others in the unauthorized practice of law.35 Court rules
provide that attorney violators are subject to sanctions varying in severity
from reprimand to disbarment.36 A court rule also permits the superior
court, for just cause, to punish or restrain any person, attorney or nonattor-
ney, engaged in the unauthorized practice oflaw.37
Connecticut court rules on unauthorized practice of law and on who
mayor may not practice law in the state are adopted not by the supreme
court, as in most states, but by the judges of the superior court.38 A rules
committee of the superior court initially determines whether or not a new
or revised court rule should be adopted and its decisions are submitted to
all judges of the superior court for a final decision on adoption.39 But supe-
rior court rules become effective by vote of all judges of the superior court
and without approval of the state legislature or the section 51-15a represen-
34 CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5(1) (2003) (prohibiting, under the heading of "Unau-
thorized Practice of Law", a lawyer from practicing law "in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the
regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction").
35 ld. R. 5.5(2). For a court rule that deters attorneys from assisting banks and trust companies in
the unauthorized practice of law, see Connecticut Superior Court Rule section 2-67, which prohibits
attorneys from receiving payment from a bank or trust company for preparing wills, codicils, or drafts
of such instruments or advising others as to legal rights under such instruments.
36 CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-47. A violating attorney may also be reprimanded by the statewide
grievance committee or a reviewing committee, with right of review by the superior court. [d. §§ 2-37
to -38. Section 2-37 adds additional sanctions and conditions, other than reprimand, that the statewide
grievance committee or a reviewing committee may impose on attorney violators of the Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct. Among these additional sanctions are restitution and assessment of costs. /d. § 2-
37.
37 [d. § 2-44.
38 The legal authority for superior court rulemaking on unauthorized practice by nonattomeys is
somewhat vague and uncertain. A statute authorizing the superior court, as well as the supreme court
and appellate court, to adopt rules "regulating pleading, practice and procedure in judicial proceedings"
could be construed to include rulemaking on nonattomey unauthorized practice. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 51-14 (2003). There also is a long statutory and caselaw history in Connecticut of superior
court rulemaking on pleading, practice and procedure in judicial proceedings. See William M. Maltbie,
The Rule-Making Power of the Judges, in THE CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK OF 1951 xi, xi-xvi
(1951) (detailing the early history of Connecticut's judicial rulemaking); DoNNA J. PUGH ET AL., JUDI-
CIAL RULEMAKING: A COMPENDIUM 36-39 (1984) (reviewing the history of judicial rulemaking in
Connecticut); see generally Richard S. Kay, The Rule-making Authority and Separation of Powers in
Connecticut, 8 CONN. L. REv. I (1975) (evaluating rulemaking by Connecticut courts critically). And
there is caselaw authority in ,Connecticut and elsewhere suggesting that the courts have an inherent
right to make procedural rules. See Maltbie, supra at xvi. This inherent power conceivably could be
extended to include judicial rulernaking authority over unauthorized practice by nonattomeys.
39 On adoption and the effective date of rules adopted by the superior court judges, see section 1-
9 of the Connecticut Superior Court Rules. There is surprisingly limited reference to the rules commit-
tee of the superior court in either the Connecticut statutes or court rules. The committee is briefly
referred to in section 1-9 of the Connecticut Superior Court Rules and sections 51-14 and 51-15a of the
General Statutes ofConnecticut.
Representatives of the state legislature's joint standing committee on the judiciary and the supe-
rior court rules committee meet at least annually to consider matters of mutual interest. CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 51-15a (2003).
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tatives.40 The rules committee currently has nine members, eight of whom
are superior court judges.41 The chair is a supreme court justice.42 The
Chief Justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court appoints five of the nine
members, including the chair, and the superior court judges appoint the
other four. 43 The rules committee of the superior court receives research
.assistance from the lawyers in the Court Operations Division of the State of
Connecticut Judicial Branch.44 The rules committee usually meets
monthly, except in July and August, and at least one of its annual meetings
is a public session to receive comments on proposed superior court rules
revisions it is considering.4s Most of those who appear at these hearings
are attorneys, and the Connecticut Bar Association often sends a represen-
tative to testify at the hearings.46 The rules committee will soon consider
extensive changes in the Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct pro-
posed by the CBA House of Delegates; and which changes in the ABA's
recent revisions of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct should
be adopted in Connecticut. These include controversial ABA proposals for
changes in Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rules 5.5 and 8.5 pertain-
ing to the unauthorized practice of law.
C. Executive Agency Regulations
Most of the many Connecticut state executive agencies that hold hear-
ings on contested matters have regulations as to who may appear before the
agency. Violators presumably are engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law. Typical of agency regulatory language as to who, other than agency
personnel, may appear at agency hearings is that "[a] party or intervenor
may appear in person or by an attorney or other representative.'>47 Some
regulations are more detailed.48 One even adds: "Nothing contained herein
40 .
CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 1-9; PUGH ET AL., supra note 38, at 38.
41 Telephone Interview with Carl Testo, Director of Legal Services, Court Operations Division,
State of Connecticut Judicial Branch (Oct. 14,2003).
42/d.
43 /d. The appointments by the chiefjustice presumably are among the responsibilities of that po-
sition as head of the judicial depanment. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § SI-Ib(a) (2003) (stating that "[t]he
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall be the head of the Judicial Department and shaH be responsi-
ble for its administration").
44 Telephone Interview with Carl Testo, supra note 41.
4S /d.
46 /d.; see PUGH ET AL., supra note 38, at 38 (noting the bar's influence on judicial rule develop-
ment and adoption).
47 CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 22a-3a-6(g) (1997) (stating the Depanment of Environmental Pro-
tection contested cases rule). For agency regulations using very similar language, see, for example, id.
§ 16-1-29 to 30 (1997) (stating the Department of Public Utility control representation of parties and
intervenors rule and its definition of "attomey"); id. § 17-311-29 (1995) (stating the Department of
Income Maintenance representation of parties and intervenors rule).
48 E.g., id. § 27-1021(d)-SI(21) (1998) (stating in the Department of Veterans' Affairs definitions
rule that '''[r]epresentative' means an informal or formal agent of the petitioner or respondent, includ-
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shall be construed to require any representative to be an attorney at law.'>49
A few regulations also include provisions as to who may represent the
agency.50 Regulations of several agencies even restrict or prohibit former
commissioners or other former employees from appearing before the




Given the prevalence over time of legal services being provided by in-
dividuals and entities that are not attorneys and the many different kinds of
ing a spouse, an adult child, an attorney, a conservator and any other party authorized by a program
participant or a court of competent jurisdiction to act on behalf of a party and who has informed the
agency of such designation, or anyone provided by the Commissioner").
Former regulations on hearings to determine if a child should be removed from a foster home,
provided that an advocate for the child should be designated by the Department of Children and Fami-
lies and be a private social service agency or qualified professional outside the Department. ld. § 17a-
98-4(d)(2)(A) and (B) (repealed 1997). Also, the regulations stated that the foster parent was permitted
to brin§ an attorney or other representative to the hearing. ld. § 17a-98-4(d)(3) (repealed 1997).
4 ld. § 31-376-14(d) (1999) (stating the Occupational Health and Safety Review Commission
rule re~arding representatives of parties and intervenors rule).
5 E.g., id. § 17-2a-7 (1995) (Department of Income Maintenance witnesses rule stating that at
hearings on appeals of departmental decisions or actions, the Department may be represented by the
social worker, investigator or supervisor and "if necessary, by a consultant who is acquainted with the
technical aspect of property or medical questions involved"); id. § 17a-98-4(d)(6)(A) (repealed 1997)
(Department of Children & Families hearing procedures rule stating that in proceedings to remove a
child from a foster home "[t]he department shall be represented by the regional office social worker for
the child and the supervisor or program supervisor involved in the decision to remove the child").
5 I For example, the Connecticut Department of labor/Board of labor Relations regulations state:
Any person who at any time has been a member of or employed by the board shall
not be permitted to appear as attorney or representative for any person, firm, corpo-
ration or organization until the expiration of six (6) months from the termination of
his employment with the board, nor shall he at any time be pennitted to appear in
any case which was pending before the board during the period of his employment
with the board.
/d. § 31-101-73 (1999).
In addition, Department of Banking regulations state:
Except when specially authorized by the commissioner, no person who has served
as commissioner, deputy commissioner, or employee of the commissioner shall prac-
tice or act as attorney, agent or representative in any contested case before the com-
missioner or by any means aid in the preparation or prosecution of any such con-
tested case which was pending before the commissioner while that person was so
serving, if such representation or other employment in the contested case does or
may involve the disclosure of confidential information acquired while serving as
such commissioner or employee of the commissioner. In all cases except upon indi-
vidual application and showing that such subsequent employment is not contrary to
the public interest, no former commissioner or employee of the commissioner shall
appear before the commissioner or accept employment in connection with any con-
tested case before the commissioner within six (6) months after the termination of
such employment.
ld. § 36-1-20 (1998).
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businesses that provide some legal services to their customers, a surpris-
ingly small number of reported opinions of Connecticut courts have held
nonattorneys to be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, Moreover,
some of the opinions are so old that there are doubts as to whether they
would be upheld ifreconsidered by today's courts. One of the most impor-
tant of the earlier cases held two Connecticut commercial banks to have
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law due to activities of the banks'
trust department employees,52 In this case the court concluded that the
employees, including attorney employees, had violated the state's unau-
thorized practice laws when they prepared probate court instruments for
estates the banks were administering53 and when the banks' attorneyem-
ployees appeared in a fiduciary capacity before probate courts in matters
pertaining to estates the banks were administering,54
Other nonattomeys or their firms that Connecticut courts have held had
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law include a mutual fund sales
operation that provided estate and trust documents and advice to its cus-
tomers;55 a legal document preparation service that prepared for its custom-
ers such documents as wills, living trusts, and essential name change and
divorce documents;56 and divorce assistance services that included legal
document preparation and legal advice to persons seeking a pro se di-
vorce,57
52
State Bar Ass'n v. Conn. Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222,236-37, 140 A.2d 863, 871 (1958),
off'd, 146 Conn. 556, 564, 153 A.2d 453, 458 (1959).
53 Id. at 871. However, in its injunction and declaratory order on subsequent appeal the court
clarified its previous position by stating that the acts are not the "illegal practice of law unless the
problems involved in the particular case are such that their solution is commonly understood to be the
practice oflaw." Conn. Bank & Trust Co., 153 A.2d at 457 n.3.
54
Conn. Bank & Trust Co., 140 A.2d at 871. See a/so Conn. Bank & Trust Co., 153 A.2d at 457
n.3 (designating an injunction and declaratory order in accord with the earlier opinion). But if. King v,
Guiliani, 9 Conn. L. Rptr. No. 17,527,531 (Conn. Super. Cl1993) (holding that attorneys working for
a captive insurance company law firm involved in that case may represent insured persons in claims
against the insurer, as the interests of the insurer and insured did not conflict).
55 Grievance Comm. v. Dacey, 154 Conn. 129, 148, 156,222 A.2d 339, 349, 352 (1966) (holding
that defendant violated section 51-88 of the General Statutes of Connecticut, a statute that the court also
held was not so vague as to be unconstitutional).
56 Statewide Grievance Cornm. v. Patton, 239 Conn. 251,253,255,683 A.2d 1359, 1360, 1361
(19961 (holding that defendant violated CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-88).
7 Statewide Grievance Comm. v. Harris, 239 Conn. 256,257,683 A.2d 1362, 1362 (1996) (hold-
ing that defendant, a nonattomey, violated CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-88 when he advertised an uncon-
tested pro se divorce assistance service with the advertisement stating that, "Paralegals prepare al1
papers for your signing and step you through the self-help divorce."); Statewide Grievance Comm. v.
ladora, 62 Conn. App. 828, 833, 772 A.2d 681, 684 (2001) (stating that "[a)dvertising alone is suffi-
cient to constitute the unauthorized practice of law if the advertisement is for activity that amounts to
legal services."); cf. Monroe v. Horwitch, 820 F. Supp. 682,688 (D. Conn. 1993) (holding that a para-
legal who advertised that she would prepare court papers for parties proceeding pro se in divorce cases
was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of section 51·88 of the General Statutes of
Connecticut).
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An early Connecticut case also held a nonattomey, business not dis-
closed in the opinion, to have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
when drafting a will for another person.58 Another early Connecticut case
held that a town clerk was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
when she made real estate title searches and then submitted title opinions to
savings banks and loan associations on the properties involved.59 Only one
Connecticut reported judicial opinion has considered whether accountants'
services are the unauthorized practice of law. In that case the court held
that the accountant's services in attempting to negotiate a federal claim of
tax delinquency did not constitute illegal law practice and the court relied
in part and quoted at length from a New York case holding that tax returns
usually may be prepared by accountants, although if involved and difficult
legal questions arise, advice should be sought from a qualified lawyer.60
Quite universally in the United States, one category of nonattomey, an
individual person, is exempt from unauthorized practice restrictions when
providing legal services to himself or herself. Connecticut courts have
frequently recognized this right of self-representation by an individual;61
and, in doing so, have often stated that they will treat such pro se litigants
with some leniency.62 However, they also have declared that this "leniency
should not be invoked as to affect adversely the other parties' rights,'>63 nor
should it authorize lack of compliance with relevant rules of procedural or
substantive law.64 The self-representation right exists only for natural per-
sons, not for corporations or other organizations,65 and a corporation cannot
58 State v. Thiede, 4 Conn. Supp. 438 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1937).
59 Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325,332, 22 A.2d 623, 627 (1941) (holding that the de-
fendant violated an unauthorized practice statute then in effect).
60 Kiniry v. Degutis, 18 Conn. Supp. 186, 190-98 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1953) (holding that the ac-
countant was entitled to be paid for his services, although less than he had requested (construing In re
New York County Lawyers Ass'n, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209, 216-21 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948))).
61 But the right of self-representation does not extend to a husband appearing in court represent-
ing his wife pro se. Johnson v. 1vimey, 3 Conn. App. 392, 395, 488 A.2d 1275, 1277 (1985).
62 There are many cases in which the courts apparently treated pro se litigants with special leni-
ency. See, e.g., Galland v. Bronson, 204 Conn. 330, 527 A.2d 1192 (1987); Higgins v. Hartford
County Bar Ass'n, 109 Conn. 690, 145 A. 20 (1929); cf Bitonti v. Tucker, 162 Conn. 626, 295 A.2d
545 (1972) (granting great latitude to a pro se litigant's arguments on appeal but, in so far as it was
possible for the court to understand them, the court concluded that the arguments advanced had no
merit).
63 Sicaras v. City of Hartford, 44 Conn. App. 771,788,692 A.2d 1290, 1300 (1997) (quoting La
Sacco v. Young, 20 Conn. App. 6, 12,564 A.2d 610, 614 (1989»; see also Conn. Light & Power Co. v.
K1uczinsky, 171 Conn. 516, 519-20, 370 A.2d \306, \308 (1976) (being solicitous of the rights ofa pro
se defendant, but in doing so the court would not '''interfere with the just rights' of the plaintiff." (quot-
ing H~jns, 145 A. at 20 (\ 929))).
Lemoine v. McCann,40Conn. App. 460, 465, 673 A.2d liS, 118 (1996).
65 Am. Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Clark & Fray Const. Co., 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 284,286, 198 A.2d 68,
69 (1963). But cf Margaret Maunder Assocs. v. A-Copy, Inc., 40 Conn. Supp. 361,364-65,499 A.2d
1172, 1174 (1985) (permitting the president and sole stockholder of the plaintiff corporation to repre-
sent the corporation in court, the court stated, "Maunder is not acting for another in a true sense, for,
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practice law by employing attorneys to do so in the corporation's name.66
In addition to nonattorneys' pro se representation rights in certain limited
circumstances, Connecticut courts have held that specified types of persons
or organizations who were not attorneys or law firms could provide some
legal services to others. These include the right of a commercial bank or
trust company to perfonn certain acts, among them providing general in-
formation about relevant laws or reviewing legal instruments. These acts
can be performed as incidents to the bank's or trust company's fiduciary
business in serving customers or prospective customers.67 In another case,
a Connecticut court held that nonattorney social workers employed and
acting for a state government department could draft, sign and file parental
termination petitions in a Connecticut court proceeding without this consti-
tuting the unauthorized practice oflaw.68
The usual sanction imposed when nonlawyers have been determined
by a Connecticut court to have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
although she is acting for a separate legal entity, she is the sole owner and stockholder of that entity. In
effect. she is acting for herself ....n).
66
State Bar Ass'n v. Conn. Bank & Trust Co.• 145 Conn. 222. 234-36. 140 A.2d 863, 870-71
(1958).
67 For example. the court's injunctive order provided in part as follows:
In giving general information to customers and prospective customers on such
matters as federal and state tax laws. inter-vivos and testamentary trusts. wills. etc.,
as well as reviewing existing wills, where the defendant gives no specific advice,
charges no fee, and urges the customers to consult their own attorneys for advice on
their specific situations and have them draw any necessary instruments, the defen-
dant is not engaged in the illegal practice of law but is performing these acts as inci-
dent to its authorized fiduciary business.
State Bar Ass'n v. Conn. Bank & Trust Co., 146 Conn. 556, 563 n.3, 153 A.2d 453, 457 n.3 (1959).
The order also permitted certain activities by the defendant if the problems do not involve a solu-
tion that is commonly understood to be the practice oflaw. More specifically, the order provided:
In preparing and filing in the probate courts the various applications, petitions, ac-
counts, inventories and distributions pertaining to estates and trusts, conservatorships
and guardianships, the defendant is performing the ordinary and incidental services
relative to estates and trusts assumed by it under the statutes authorizing it to act as
fiduciary and is not engaged in the illegal practice of law unless the problems in-
volved in the particular case are such that their solution is commonly understood to
be the practice of law.
The work of preparing and filing tax returns for the defendant as fiduciary and
dealing with, and appearing before, state and federal tax authorities in connection
with taxes claimed to be due from the defendant as fiduciary may properly be done
by regular employees of the defendant, either lawyers or laymen, to the extent that
tax law problems of a type such that their solution would be commonly understood
to be the practice of law are not involved.
Id.
68 In re Darlene C., 247 Conn. 1,9·15,717 A.2d 1242, 1247-50 (1998) (holding that sections
17a-6(n), l7a-112. and 46b-129 of the General Statutes of Connecticut and section 26-1(1) of the Con-
necticut Practice Book authorize this petition work by social workers employed and acting for the State
Department of Children and Families).
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is a court ordered injunction prohibiting further such conduct,69 and with
the possibility of the enjoined party being held in contempt if the injunction
order is violated.70 Criminal prosecution, with the possibility of a criminal
sanction being imposed, is also a possibility but has rarely occurred.71
2. Attorneys
It is possible for attorneys to engage in conduct legally prohibited as
the unauthorized practice of law and there are reported opinions by Con-
necticut courts so holding. Attorneys admitted to practice law in another
state but not in Connecticut have been held by Connecticut courts to be
engaged in the illegal practice of law when they provide legal services in or
primarily in Connecticut for their clients. These services can include such
out-of-court assistance to clients as legal advice, drafting of legal instru-
ments, negotiating business acquisitions, and the formation of Connecticut
corporations.72 However, on a showing of good cause, a Connecticut court
will grant permission pro hac vice fOT an out-of-state attorney not admitted
in Connecticut to appear before it in a designated case.73 If granting such
permission would thwart a legitimate state interest, permission will be de-
69 See. e.g.• Statewide Grievance Comm. v. Patton. 239 COM. 251.252-53.683 A.2d 1359. 1360
(1996); Grievance Comm. of Bar of Fairfield Countyv. Dacey, 154 Conn. 129.131-32.148.156.222
A.2d 339. 341-42, 349, 352 (1966); Conn. Bank & Trust Co.• 153 A.2d at 457 n.3.
70 See Statewide Grievance Comm. v. zadora, 62 Conn. App. 828,834.772 A.2d 681. 684 (2001)
(affirming a holding that the defendant was in contempt for violating an injunction prohibiting the
practice of law).
71 For criminal convictions of nonlawyers for unauthorized practice of law. see. for example,
State v. Davis. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 257,257-59,197 A.2d 668, 669-70 (1963). See also State v. Thiede, 4
Conn. Supp. 438 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1937) (imposing a fine of twenty-five dollars for the unauthorized
practice of law).
72 See. e.g.• Perlah v. S.E.I. Corp., 29 Conn. App. 43, 48. 612 A.2d 806,809 (1992) (holding that
an attorney admitted in New York violated section 51-88 of the General Statutes of Connecticut when
the attorney practiced in Connecticut prior to his admission to practice in Connecticut); Taft v. Amsel.
23 Conn. Supp. 225.228.180 A.2d 756,757 (1962) (holding that a New York attorney violated section
51-88); see also In re Peterson. 163 B.R. 665. 675 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994) (holding that a New York
attorney not admitted to practice in Connecticut who had an office in Connecticut and restricted his
practice to federal law matters was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and violated section 51-
88 of the General Statutes of Connecticut). The court ordered the attorney to return legal fees paid to
him when he advised Connecticut debtors on bankruptey-related matters. but the court noted that the
attorney's activities would not have been the unauthorized practice of law if the services he rendered
had been for those services ''reasonably necessary and incident to the specific matter pending in this
[bankruptcy) court" as he was authorized to practice in bankruptcy court. Id. at 675-77. But cf
Windover v. Sprague Techs.• 834 F. Supp. 560 (D. Conn. 1993). In Windover. the court observed that
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co.• 140 A.2d 863 (1958):
seems to imply that in-house counsel. who typically give legal advice to their corpo-
rate employer. would be engaged in the practice of law . . . in violation of
§ 51-88 ... [yJet, the large number of in-house counsel working in Connecticut who
are not members of the stale bar tends to show either that this interpretation of the
statute is inconect or that the statule is not enforced.
Windover. 834 F. Supp. at 566.
73
CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-16.
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nied.74
Attorneys licensed to practice law in Connecticut are also prohibited
by Connecticut law from engaging in or assisting in the unauthorized prac-
tice of law. This includes practicing law in another jurisdiction when not
legally authorized to do so or assisting another person in the unauthorized
practice of law.75 There are few reported Connecticut judicial opinions on
these kinds of conduct by Connecticut attorneys, A fairly recent Superior
Court opinion holds that house counsel admitted to practice in Connecticut
and employed full-time by an insurance company are not assisting the
company in the unauthorized practice of law when the house counsel are
representing insured persons in claims covered by the insurance company's
policies.76 As the interests of insurer and insured were not in conflict, there
was no unauthorized practice of law and the representation was permissi-
ble.77 A much earlier Connecticut Supreme Court case took a contrary
position on the unauthorized practice of law issue when a bank's house
counsel, admitted in Connecticut, represented the decedents' estates before
Connecticut probate courts when the bank was a fiduciary of the estates
involved.78 The attorneys were enjoined from further engaging in such
conduct,79
Injunction is the sanction most likely to be imposed on attorneys, either
Connecticut attorneys or out-of-state attorneys, when a court finds that they
74
See, e.g., Henmann v. Summer Plaza Corp., 201 Conn. 263,270,513 A.2d 1211, 1215 (1986)
(upholding denial of pro hac vice admission by the trial court because the out-of-state attorney had
other commitments and could not try the case on the date set by the court; the court noted that this
denial was a proper exercise of the trial court's discretion in furthering docket control and expeditious
casetlow management); Enquire Printing & Publ'g Co. v. O'Reilly, 193 Conn. 370, 376-77,477 A.2d
648,652 (1984) (denying pro hac vice admission as the out-of-state attorney was expected to be called
as a witness in the case, and if called the attorney could not continue his representation of the party
without violating a section of the Code of Professional Conduct prohibiting contlict of interest); State v.
Reed, 174 Conn. 287, 292-94, 386 A.2d 243, 247-48 (1978) (upholding the denial of pro hac vice
admission because of the attomey's likely contlict of interest and scheduling problems if the admission
was granted); cf Yale Literary Magazine v. Yale Univ., 4 Conn. App. 592, 60S, 496 A.2d 201, 208
(1985) (reversing the denial ofpro hac vice admission as denial would not further any legitimate state
interest). But cf. Williams v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 24 Conn. L. Rptr. No. 15,537 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1999) (denying a pro hac vice request because "[n)o suggestion is raised of defendant's
inability to secure the services of skilled Connecticut counsel, nor is any claim advanced that ... [the)
denial of permission will affect the defendant's personal or financial welfare").
75 See, e.g., CONN. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2003).
76 See King v. Guiliani, 9 Conn. L. Rptr. 527 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993). The house counsel in this
case were working in a captive law firm, one in which all attorneys and staff were employees of the
insurance company. Id. at 528. For the court's definition of a captive law firm, see id. at 535 n.3. But
whether the attorneys were working in a captive· law firm rather than a more traditional corporate law
department apparently was of no significance to the decision in this case.
77 Id. at 53 I.
78
. State Bar Ass'n v. Conn. Bank & Trust Co., 146 Conn. 556, 563 n.3, 153 A.2d 453, 457 n.3
(1959),
19 1d.
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have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Regarding such conduct
there also is case authority for reprimanding a Connecticut attorney80 and
preventing out-of-state attorneys from receiving or retaining legal fees for
their unauthorized practice services.81
3. Policy Arguments Justifying Unauthorized Practice Laws
Connecticut courts in most of their reported opinions in unauthorized
practice cases have not alluded to policy arguments.82 But when policy
arguments have been considered in deciding unauthorized practice cases,
they have been stated very briefly and in very general terms. An example
of the latter is this statement by Connecticut's highest court in justifying
the restriction of law practice to attorneys:
It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions [typical lawyer services of liti-
gation, instrument drafting and legal advice] be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill and of sound
moral character, acting at all times under the heavy trust obli-
gation to clients which rests upon all attorneys.83
In discussing the policy rationale for limiting the practice of law to attor-
neys, a Connecticut trial court stated:
[The] requirements for admission to the bar are to protect
members of the public, clients and the courts. "The ultimate
purpose of all regulations of the admission of attorneys is to
assure the courts the assistance of advocates of ability, learn-
ing and sound character and to protect the public from in-
competent and dishonest practitioners.,,84
80 See, e.g., Haymond v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 45 Conn. Supp. 481,481-82,723 A.2d
821, 823 (1997), ajf'd, 247 Conn. 436, 439, 723 A.2d 808, 809 (1999).
81 See, e.g., In re Peterson, 163 B.R. 665, 675-76 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994) (ordering attorneys'
fees paid for unauthorized practice services be repaid); Perlah v. S.E.I. Corp., 29 Conn. App. 43, 48,
612 A.2d 806, 809 (1992) (holding that the plaintiff was prohibited from compensation for legal service
occurring prior to his admission to the Connecticut bar); Taft v. Arnsel, 23 Conn. Supp. 225, 227, 180
A.2d 756, 757 (1962) (stating that "[t]he law seems to be well settled that no one is entitled to recover
compensation for services as an attorney at law unless he has been duly admitted to practice before the
court").
82 A policy, as the term is used here, is a course of action to achieve one or more important social
goals or values.
83
State Bar Ass'n v. Conn. Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222,235, 140 A.2d 863, 870 (1958)
(holding that a corporation cannot legally practice law). Similar language to the above appears in
Grievance Committee ofthe Bar ofNew Haven County v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 330-31, 22 A.2d 623,
626 (1941), which held that a nonlawyer town clerk was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
when ~iving title opinions on real property.
4 King v. Guiliani, 9 Conn. L. Rptr. 527, 530 (Super. Ct. 1993) (quoting Rosenthal v. State Bar
Examining Comm., 116 Conn. 409, 415,165 A. 211,213 (1933».
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Connecticut courts also have occasionally rejected policy, arguments ad-
vanced by litigating parties in unauthorized practice cases. An example of
this is a case in which the court considered whether salaried house counsel
are practicing law.8s On this issue the Connecticut Supreme Court said:
The appellant seems to claim that, as a matter of public pol-
icy, a salaried attorney for a single client could not qualify as
being engaged in the practice of law because he would be
subject to the control, through the power of discharge, of his
one client, and consequently he would be under strong com-
pulsion to do that client's bidding, whether in accordance
with, or contrary to, applicable standards of ethical legal
practice. We find little merit in this policy claim.86
In another case, the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected the argument that
the public policy against unauthorized practice of law is so strong that a
taxpayer contracting for unauthorized practice services in appealing a local
property tax assessment, if the services are found to be unauthorized, bars
the taxpayer's right to appea1.87 The court concluded that the public policy
in favor of fair and accurate taxation should prevail and the unresolved
assertion of unauthorized law practice should be addressed, if at all, by the
statewide grievance committee, the arm of the judicial system that handles
such matters.88
Unlike academics, who in their legal analyses are prone to stress policy
arguments, Connecticut courts in their reported unauthorized practice of
law opinions, infrequently consider policy arguments, and when they do,
these arguments rarely seem to be the controlling determinant of how cases
are decided.
E. Advisory Opinions on the Unauthorized Practice ofLaw
Two committees of the Connecticut Bar Association on request issue
advisory opinions on whether certain fact specific conduct violates the
state's unauthorized practice laws. These committees are the Unauthorized
Practice Committee and the Professional Ethics Committee.89 Advisory
opinions by these committees do not have the force of law and are not
binding on the courts or the Statewide Grievance Committee. But they are
useful guides to the law's meaning and Connecticut courts have sometimes
8S In re Hunt, 155 Conn. 186, 191-92,230 A.2d 432, 434 (1967).
86/d.
87 Robertson v. Town of Stonington, 253 Conn. 255, 259, 750 A.2d 460, 463 (2000).
88 Id. at 463-64.
89 On procedures and requirements of the committees for issuance of advisory opinions, see
CONN. BAR ASS'N COMM. ON UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW R. P. § III (on file with the Connecti-
cut Law Review); CONN. BAR ASS'N COMM. ON PROF'L ETHICS, R. OF COMM. P. § I (2003) (on file
with the Connecticut Law Review).
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even cited them in support of their judicial opinions on troublesome is-
sues.9O It is also very unlikely that a lawyer who obtains an advisory opin-
ion from one of the committees will be sanctioned for conduct that is in
compliance with the opinion.
The Unauthorized Practice Committee holds meetings at the discretion
of the committee chair, and the Professional Ethics Committee holds meet-
ings approximately once a month.91 Members of each committee are
members of the Connecticut Bar Association committee members are ap-
pointed annually by the president of the Connecticut Bar Association:92 and
receive no compensation for their services. The Unauthorized Practice
Committee currently has thirteen members and the Professional Ethics
Committee currently has fifty-one members. The usual procedure of each
committee in considering requests for opinions is for the committee chair
to assign to one committee member the duty of drafting an opinion re-
sponding to the request and the member's draft is then considered and
voted upon by the full committee membership.93 As new requests come in,
the committee chair rotates among the members the duty of preparing an
initial draft so that eventually each member takes on this responsibility.94
The Unauthorized Practice Committee will give an advisory opinion on
any aspect of Connecticut unauthorized practice law.95 The Professional
Ethics Committee gives advisory opinions only on issues arising under the
Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the Connecticut Superior Court
and relatively few of the Committee's opinions are concerned with issues
of unauthorized practice.96 On unauthorized practice matters involving
compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct the jurisdiction of the
Unauthorized Practice and Professional Ethics Committees overlap some-
90 See, e.g., Haymond v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 45 Conn. Supp. 481, 484, 723 A.2d 821,
824 (1997) (citing Conn. Bar Ass'n Profl Ethics, Informal Op. 95-2, concerning requirements for
advertising in Connecticut by a law firm with an office in Connecticut and requirements for providing
legal services in Connecticut when a named partner of the firm is not a member of the Connecticut bar),
afJ'd. 247 Conn. 436, 439, 723 A.2d 808, 809 (1999).
91 CONN. BAR ASS'N COMM. ON UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAw R. P. § II (on file with the
Connecticut Law Review); CONN. BAR ASS'N COMM. ON PROF'L ETHICS, R. OF COMM. P. § 1II (2003)
(on file with the Connecticut Law Review).
92 CONN. BAR ASS'N COMM. ON UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW R. P. § I (on file with the
Connecticut Law Review); CONN. BAR ASS'N COMM. ON PROF'L ETHICS, R. OF COMM. P. § II (2003)
(on file with the Connecticut Law Review).
93 CONN. BAR ASS'N COMM. ON UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAw R. P. § III (on file with the
Connecticut Law Review); CONN. BAR ASS'N COMM. ON PROF'L ETHICS, R. OF COMM. P. § IV (2003)
(on file with the Connecticut Law Review).
94 CONN. BAR ASS'N COMM. ON UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAw R. P. § 1II(CX2) (on file with
the Connecticut Law Review); CONN. BAR ASS'N COMM. ON PROF'L ETHICS, R. OF COMM. P. §
IV(C)(I) (2003) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review).
95 CONN. BAR ASS'N COMM. ON UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAw R. P. § III(B) (on file with
the Connecticut Law Review)
96 PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY REFERENCE GUIDE i (Conn. Bar Ass'n 2000).
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what. Advisory opinions when issued are matters ofpublic record.97 They
generally are not subject to final approval by any other Connecticut Bar
Association official or body.98
Advisory opinions issued by the committees cover a wide variety of is-
sues. Among relatively recent opinions of the Unauthorized Practice
Committee is a 2002 opinion on house counsel. It states that house counsel
not admitted to practice law in Connecticut, but whose principal office is in
Connecticut, are engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when per-
forming certain legal services in Connecticut for their employer.99 Another
recent advisory opinion of the committee concerns the practice rights of a
person admitted to practice by an Indian tribe but not licensed as an attor-
97 For a compilation through 1997 of all Professional Ethics Committee formal opinions since
1954 and informal opinions since 1986. see PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY REFERENCE GUIDE, supra
nole 96. For the Conneclicut opinions and those of other state bars see also the annual volumes of the
National Reporter on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility. Nat'l Rep. Legal Ethics (Univ.
Pub. Am.).
The number of advisory opinions issued by the Professional Ethics Committee varies considera-
bly over time. For example, in 1998 the Committee issued twenty-seven opinions, but only thirteen
opinions in 2002. {d. at xv-xviii. During the past few years the Unauthorized Practice Committee has
been issuing an average ofonly one or two advisory opinions each year.
98 Opinions of the Unauthorized Practice Committee or the Professional Ethics Committee may
be either informal or formal opinions, but most committee opinions are informal opinions. Formal
opinions are for questions of unusual importance. In recent years the Professional Ethics Committee
has occasionally issued formal opinions whereas the Unauthorized Practice Committee has issued none.
Committee fonnal opinions may not be finally adopted until submitted to the Connecticut Bar Associa-
tion ("CBA") Board of Governors for its comments and suggestions. If the Board of Governors has
comments or suggestions, the submitting committee must then consider them at a subsequent meeting.
At this meeting the committee has the option to adopt the opinion, with or without any changes. How-
ever, if twenty-five members of the CBA or a majority of the Board of Governors request a hearing
following reconsideration and approval of the original opinion by the committee, the House of Dele-
gates will hold such a hearing and determine if the opinion should be adopted as an official opinion of
the CBA. Informal opinions, in contrast, are adopted and become tinal by committee action without
required review by the Board of Governors. On requirements for formal and informal opinions by the
two committees and procedures for their adoption, see CONN. BAR ASS'N BYLAWS, arts. IX, X (on tile
with the Connecticut Law Review); CONN. BAR ASS'N COMM. ON UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAw
R. P. § III(B) (on tile with the Connecticut Law Review); CONN. BAR ASS'N COMM. ON PROF'L ETH.
ICS, R. OFCOMM. P. §§ IV-VI (2003)(on tile with the Connecticut Law Review).
99 This opinion is entitled Unauthorized Practice of Law by Locally Unadmitted In-House Coun-
sel and includes the following statement: "Locally unadmitted in-house counsel are not authorized to
practice law in Connecticut; and in Connecticut, when representing their employer, they cannot give
legal advice on Connecticut law, draft legal documents that involve Connecticut law, or appear in
Connecticut state courts." Opinion Letter on "Unauthorized Practice of Law by Locally Unadmitted in-
House Counsel" (July 23, 2002) available at http://www.ethicsandlawyering.comllssueslfilesl
ConnUPL.pdf (last visited Nov. 17,2003) (on tile with the Connecticut Law Review). The opinion
does note that some stales specially authorize such in-house counsel to practice law representing their
employer and that the Connecticut Bar Association House of Delegates in January 2000 unanimously
recommended to the Superior Court Rules Committee that a rule be adopted authorizing such represen-
tation. Id. Subsequent to the opinion by the Unauthorized Practice Committee, the Superior Court
Rules Committee ultimately rejected the recommendation. On the Rules Committee rejection, see
Thomas B. Scheffey, Setback/or In-House Status, CONN. LAw. TRIB., May 19,2003, at 3.
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ney by Connecticut law. loo Among relatively recent opinions of the Profes-
sional Ethics Committee concerned with unauthorized practice issues are
one advising that a nonresident attorney, not licensed to practice law in
Connecticut, may be a named partner in a Connecticut law partnership;101 a
law firm representing a seller of real estate may assign a nonattorney em-
ployee to attend the closing and communicate information and questions
from an attorney in the firm to the buyer's attorney, but the nonattorney
employee should not express an independent opinion on legal matters or
supervise the closing; 102 and out-of-state attorneys not licensed to practice
law in Connecticut may advertise their federal immigration legal services
in Connecticut and provide such services to Connecticut residents but their
advertisements must clearly indicate that the out-of-state attorneys are not
licensed to practice law in Connecticut. 103
Another important function of the Unauthorized Practice Committee
and Professional Ethics Committee as to unauthorized practice matters is
occasionally recommending to the Connecticut Bar Association House of
Delegates approval or rejection of proposed Connecticut Superior Court
rule changes pertaining to unauthorized practice of law. The House of
Delegates then decides whether or not it will recommend to the superior
court that the proposed rule changes be made or rejected. This occasional
involvement of the committees in the law revision process expands still
further their role in helping to shape and clarify the state's unauthorized
practice laws. 104
100 This opinion was adopled by the CBA Unauthorized Practice Committee in 2002. It states
that a person could practice tribal law on tribal lands in Connecticut without being in violation of Con-
necticut unauthorized practice laws. Another 2002 opinion of the CBA Unauthorized Practice Commit-
tee concludes that an out-of-state attorney not admitted in Connecticut is engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law when representing persons in an arbitl1ltion proceeding in Connecticut. Conn. Bar
Ass'n Comm. on Unauthorized Practice of Law, Informal Op. 2002~2 (2002).
101 Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profl Ethics, Informal Op. 94-22 (1994).
102 Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on ProfI Elhics, Informal Cp. 96-16 (1996).
103 Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profl Ethics, Informal Op. 98-1 (1998).
104 Recently both committees gave extensive consideration 10 the ABA's changes to Rules 5.5
and 8.5 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct--<:hanges that if adopted as law by the state would
have important implications for expanding and clarifying legally permissible multijurisdictional law
practice by attorneys. Both committees approved the ABA's revised Rule 8.5 but refused to recom-
mend, without qualification, the ABA's Rule 5.5 proposals. The Unauthorized Practice committee
approved a modified version of Rule 5.5 and approved the comments with a major change in one of the
comments. The Professional Ethics Committee also approved a modified version of Rule 5.5, a version
recommended by the Connecticut Bar Association Task Force on Unauthorized Practice of Law
On another contentious unauthorized practice issue, multidisciplinary pl1lctice ("MDP"), a Con-
necticut Bar Association Study Committee on MDP issued a lengthy report in May 2000 following
many months of consideration. In this report the committee recommended that the CBA oppose fully
integrated MDPs and also recommended that the CBA continue to study the issue and monitor the
developments in other states and by the ABA. Connecticut Bar Ass'n, Report of the MUltidisciplinary
Practice Study Committee 24-28 (2000) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review) [hereinafter CBA
Multidisciplinary Report]. The Study Committee for a year or so after its May 2000 report did continue
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F. Ambiguity and Uncertainty in Connecticut Unauthorized Practice Law
In every field of law there is some ambiguity and uncertainty, but
given its importance to the justice system, the ambiguity and uncertainty in
Connecticut unauthorized practice law is unusually great. One of the most
important issues in Connecticut unauthorized practice law that has not been
clearly resolved is whether or not, under the Connecticut Constitution, the
courts have ultimate power, relative to the other two branches of govern-
ment, to determine what is and is not the unauthorized practice of law.
When the courts and the legislature or an executive agency are not in ac-
cord as to what constitutes the unauthorized practice oflaw, whose position
prevails? The text of the Connecticut Constitution, typical of the texts of
most state constitutions, does not explicitly answer this question. The
Connecticut Constitution, as do most state constitutions, expressly provides
for a separation of powers among the three branches of government but
without stating which branch has power over unauthorized practice of
law:05 The Connecticut Constitution does say that the state's judicial
power shall be vested in the courts and that the "powers and jurisdiction of
these courts shall be defined by law" but it does not say which governmen-
tal branch shall have this lawmaking power. 106
Nor have the courts in interpreting the Connecticut Constitution un-
equivocally stated which branch has ultimate power to determine what is or
is not the unauthorized practice of law. There is language in some older
Connecticut judicial opinions that could possibly be construed as holding
that the courts have exclusive power to determine what is the practice of
law,107 which could mean that any legislative enactments or executive
agency regulations on the unauthorized practice of law are unconstitu-
tional. But it is unlikely that present-day Connecticut courts would adopt
this exclusive judicial power position on unauthorized law practice matters.
to monitor reactions elsewhere to the MDP problem but by 2002 became inactive, as concern over the
problem had declined considerably.
105 See CONN. CONST. art. II. On the evolution of the separation of powers doctrine in Connecti-
cut, see WESLEY W. HORTON, THE CONNECTICUT STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 80-85
(1993).
106
CONN. CONST. art. V.
107 See, e.g., Heiberger v. Clark, 148 Conn. 177, 191, 169 A.2d 652, 659 (1961) (holding section
51-82 of the General Statutes of Connecticut concerning admission to practice in Connecticut of attor-
neys admitted in other states unconstitutional because "[a]ny attempt on the part of the legislative
department to direct what the rules [for qualifications necessary for the practice of law and procedures
for admission to practice law] shall be, and to determine what qualifications applicants for admission
shall possess, transgresses the constitutional power of that department"); Brown v. 0 'Connell, 36
Conn. 432, 446 (1870) (stating that "[i]t should be borne in mind that no judicial power is vested by the
constitution in the General Assembly, either directly or as an incident of the legislative power, and the
General Assembly cannot confer it[,l" but recognizing that under article 5 of the Connecticut Constitu-
tion the state legislature has the power to appoint judges but may not delegate this authority to another
governmental body).
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To do so would be inconsistent with many reported Connecticut judicial
opinions, opinions that at least in part are based on section 51-88 of the
General Statutes of Connecticut, which prohibits the practice of law by
persons not admitted to practice in Connecticut. 108 Judicial reliance on a
statute implies that the statute is constitutional and that the legislature had
the constitutional authority to enact it. Although unfortunately it is still
uncertain, the most likely position, when and if the Connecticut courts
clearly resolve the matter, is that on issues of unauthorized practice all
three governmental branches have concurrent constitutional power but ul-
timate power is in the courts. The courts' position will prevail if the courts
and another branch are not in accord on any aspect ofunauthorized practice
law. This appears to be the majority position of state courts in this country
that have clearly taken a position on the issue. 109
Another important and troublesome feature of Connecticut law of un-
authorized practice that is more ambiguous and uncertain than it need be is
the definition of the practice of law, those services that generally only at-
torneys admitted to practice in Connecticut may legally provide. No Con-
necticut statute or administrative regulation defines the practice of law and
no Connecticut court rule or judicial opinion sets forth a comprehensive
defmition of practice of law. An early Connecticut judicial opinion notes
that attempts to define the practice of law have not been particularly suc-
cessful but then adds that the purpose of the statute prohibiting the unau-
thorized practice of law is to forbid those who are not attorneys from per-
forming acts "commonly understood to be the practice of law."IIO Some
later Connecticut judicial opinions have also adopted and sought to apply
in unauthorized practice cases this definition, a defmition so vague as to be
almost meaningless" l1 Other Connecticut judicial opinions have made a
more rational attempt to define the practice of law in situations in which
unauthorized practice has been alleged and have done so by identifying the
general categories of activities that are the practice of law. These activities
include giving legal advice, preparing of legal instruments, and appearing
108 See, e.g., Statewide Grievance Comm. v. Patton, 239 Conn. 251,255,683 A.2d 1359, 1361
(1996); Grievance Comm. v. Dacey, 154 Conn. 129, 156,222 A.2d 339,352 (1966); Perlah v. S.E.I.
Corp., 29 Conn. App. 43,48,612 A.2d 806, 809 (1992); if. In re Peterson, 163 B.R. 665, 671-72
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1994).
109 See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
110 Grievance Comm. of the Bar of New Haven County v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 330, 22 A.2d
623,626 (1941).
III There are many other Connecticut opinions in which the court relied, at least in part, on what
is commonly known as the practice of law definition. See, e.g., Patton, 683 A.2d at 1361; State Bar
Ass'n v. Conn. Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222,234,140 A.2d 863, 871 (1958); Taft v. Arosel, 23
Conn. Supp. 225, 228,180 A.2d 756, 757 (1962); see also Windover v. Sprague Techs., 834 F. Supp.
560, 566 (D. Conn. 1993) (discussing the case by case approach taken by Connecticut in determining
whether a particular act constitutes the "practice of law").
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in court. I 12 It has also been held by a Connecticut court that advertising
one's availability to provide legal services, without more, is the practice of
law and can constitute the unauthorized practice of law when engaged in
by those not legally permitted to practice law. 113 These very generalized
listings of practice of law are helpful but do not set forth the many occupa-
tion by occupation or situation by situation exceptions or authorizations
that a more comprehensive and detailed definition could, and perhaps
should, provide.
But even without a more comprehensive and detailed definition of the
practice of law it is possible to enhance the clarity and certainty in the
Connecticut law of unauthorized law practice by adopting over time an
extensive scattering of laws, each of which limits or authorizes particular
law practice activities by a particular occupation or group other than attor-
neys licensed to practice in Connecticut. To some extent Connecticut has
done this. For example, any individual may provide legal services to him-
self or herself, including self-representation in court; 114 some persons hold-
ing certain government positions are expressly prohibited or restricted in
the law practice activities they may provide to others; liS and out-of-state
lawyers, subject to certain limitations, may appear pro hac vice in Con-
necticut COurtS.116 Also, the Connecticut caselaw on unauthorized law
practice considers a variety of different occupations and sets forth certain
situations in which a particular occupation may, or may not, provide legal
services to others. 117 But what is troubling about Connecticut unauthorized
practice law is the extensive gaps as to what specific occupations or groups
and what legal service activities are covered by this scattered set of laws.
Moreover, market and other conditions have changed so much since some
of the caselaw opinions were written that their validity today may be ques-
tionable. Advisory opinions of Connecticut Bar Association committees
and others, especially the more recent advisory opinions, help in filling
some of these gaps,1I8 but they are not binding law and also cover only a
very limited number of occupations and situations. A serious deficiency in
112 See, e.g., Dacey, 222 A.2d at 348-49 (holding that drafting wills and trusts and advising on
them constitutes the practice of law prohibited by statute and what is commonly known as the practice
of law definition, if adopted, does not make the statute prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law
unconstitutional because it is unduly vague.); Conn. Bank & Trust Co., 140 A,2d at 870 (stating that
"[t]he practice of law consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects and the preparation oflegal instruments covering an extensive field.").
113 Statewide Grievance Comm. v. Harris, 239 Conn. 256, 683 A.2d 1362 (1996); Statewide
Grievance Comm. v. ladora, 62 Conn. App. 828,833,772 A.2d 681,684 (2001).
tl4 See supra notes 8, 51-56 and accompanying text.
liS See supra notes 2-7, 9, II and accompanying text.
116 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
117 See, e.g., supra notes 52-57, 59..00 and accompanying text.
118 See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
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Connecticut unauthorized practice law continues to be its very extensive
ambiguity and uncertainty.
G. Enforcement and Compliance
Connecticut court rules and statutes provide a structure and detailed
procedures for enforcing the state's unauthorized practice laws. The stat-
utes in many respects duplicate coverage of the court rules,119 but if a stat-
ute and court rule are inconsistent, there is doubt as to which legally pre-
vails. The statewide grievance committee has also adopted rules of proce-
dure for itself and for local grievance panels. 120 Responsibility for enforc-
ing Connecticut unauthorized practice laws is assigned principally to these
state agencies and officials: the statewide grievance committee,12I the
statewide bar counsel,122 the disciplinary counsel,123 local grievance pan-
els,124 and the statewide grievance counsel. 125
However, the work of these agencies and officials consists mostly of
enforcing those Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct that do not
involve unauthorized practice activity. The statewide grievance commit-
tee, statewide bar counsel, and disciplinary counsel also have responsibility
for enforcing section 51-88 of the General Statutes of Connecticut, the
statute that prohibits unauthorized practice by anyone, an attorney or a
nonattomey. But section 51-88 enforcement has added relatively little to
the work burden of those with enforcement responsibility. The courts,
especially the superior court, of course also have major responsibilities for
enforcing unauthorized practice laws, both in deciding cases filed with
them and issuing court rules on enforcement structure and procedures.
The statewide grievance committee is a twenty-one-member commit-
tee, at least seven of whom shall not be attorneys, and the remainder must
119 E.g., compare, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 51-90 10 -9Oh (2003), with CONN. SUPER. CT. R. §§ 2-
29 to -38. The court rules on structure and procedures for enforcing the Connecticut Rule of Profes-
sional Conduct for attorneys are very comprehensive and detailed, while the stalutes are less so. On
Connecticut grievance procedures in attorney disciplinary cases, see also Kimberly A. Knox, Under-
stand the Grievance Process: It Could Happen to You, CONN. LAWYER, March 1996, at 6-8.120
CONN. CT. R., STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMllTEE RULES OF PROCEDURE R. I (these rules
also include procedures for the reviewing committees of the statewide grievance committee); CONN.
CT. R., GRIEVANCE PANEL RULES OF PROCEDURE R. I.
121
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-90 (2003); CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-33.
122
CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-34.
123 Id. § 2-34A.
124
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-90b (2003); CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-29.
125 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-9011 (2003); CONN. SUPER. CT. R. §§ 2-30, -31. State's attorneys
also on occasion have responsibilities for enforcing unauthorized practice laws. See, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 51-90h(d) (2003); CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-35(1). In addition, the court rules and statutes also
provide for grievance investigators whose duties may involve investigating unauthorized practice
complaints. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-9Od(a) (2003); CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-30(a). Currently there is
only one such investigator and that person operates state-wide.
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be attorneys who are members of the Connecticut bar. 126 Statewide griev-
ance committee members are appointed for three-year terms by the judges
of the superior court127 and serve without pay. Among the duties of the
statewide grievance committee in attorney disciplinary cases are holding
hearings on probable cause findings of local grievance panels and then
dismissing cases the committee concludes lack probable cause or, if the
committee finds probable cause, imposing minor sanctions or conditions or
directing disciplinary counsel to file presentments in superior court against
the respondent attorneys. 128 Among other statewide grievance committee
duties are investigating and dismissing or prosecuting those persons al-
leged to have violated section 51-88. 129 Probable cause hearings are rarely
held by the full statewide grievance committee; this function most always
is delegated to one of the three-member reviewing committees of the full
committee. 13o The statewide bar counsel is appointed by the superior court
judges. 131 It is a full-time position that provides assistance to the statewide
grievance committee and in addition, by court rule, is assigned a number of
important administrative duties. '32 Statewide bar counsel also is assigned
the important enforcement function of receiving and initially processing
complaints of attorney violation of the Connecticut Rules of Professional
Conduct. 133
The position of disciplinary counsel is very new and was established
recently by court rule in accord with recommendations of a Commission to
Study the Attorney Grievance Process. 134 The Disciplinary Counsel essen-
126 CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-33(a); cf CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-90 (2003) (establishing a statu-
tory requirement for a fifteen-member committee, at least four of whom shall not be attorneys).
127 CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-33(a), (b). A committee member may be reappointed for a second
three-r:ear tenn, but then may be reappointed only after a lapse of one year. /d. § 2-33(b).
28 Id. § 2-35(c), (e). See id. § 2-37 (outlining sanctions and conditions that the statewide griev-
ance committee or its reviewing committees may impose). Reprimand is the usual sanction imposed.
129
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-9Oa (2003); CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-33(c)(I); CONN. R. CT.,
STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMM. R. 8.
130
See CONN. SUPER. CT. R. §§ 2-35, -37; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-9Og (2003); CONN. R. CT.,
STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMM. R. 6 (on the membership and duties of reviewing committees).
131 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-90c(a) (2003); CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-34(a).
132
CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-34(b).
133 Jd. § 2-32(a); CONN. R. CT., STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMM. R. 2.
134 The Commission members were appointed by the Chief Justice of the Connecticut Supreme
Court in 1999 and the Commission issued its final report in 2002. In addition to recommending the
position of disciplinary counsel, the Commission proposed a number of other rule changes pertaining to
the attorney disciplinary process. See Final Report of Commission to Study the Attorney Grievance
Process (2002), [hereinafter REpORT OF COMMISSION) available at http://www.jud.state.ct.us/extemal/
news/archive.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2003) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review). See also
Robert I. Berdon, Protecting the Public and Atlorneys, CONN. LAWYER, May 2003, at 8. Justice
Berdon chaired the study commission. REpORT OF COMMISSION, supra, Notice page. It is estimated
that when staffing to implement the new rule changes is fully completed, there will be five full-time
assistant disciplinary counsel to assist the chief disciplinary counsel and the number of full-time assis-
tant bar counsel will be reduced from five to three, at a net additional cost to the system of approxi-
HeinOnline -- 36 Conn. L. Rev. 326 2003-2004
326 CONNECTICUT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 36:303
tially is a prosecutor and is responsible for preparing and presenting cases
against violators of attorney disciplinary rules in proceedings before the
statewide grievance committee, superior court, or in some cases before
local grievance panels, and for investigating and prosecuting in court com-
plaints against any violators of section 51-88, either attorneys or nonattor-
neys.135 Disciplinary counsel also may negotiate disposition of cases
against respondent attorneys who have conditionally admitted to miscon-
duct, dispositions that then must be approved by a court or a reviewing
committee of the statewide grievance committee.136 The new position of
disciplinary counsel takes over most of the prosecutorial duties formerly
assigned to the statewide bar counsel,137 adding some additional powers
and duties. The new position expands the state's efforts to enforce the at-
torney disciplinary rules and, as well, section 51-88. One of the expected
results of this is a more favorable public opinion of the enforcement sys-
tem, particularly by complainants, as under the new rules those filing com-
plaints of attorney disciplinary misconduct will in many instances receive
disciplinary counsel assistance at the local grievance panel level. '38 The
new position of disciplinary counsel also relieves the heavy work burden
on the statewide bar counsel and enables statewide bar counsel to give
more time and attention to that position's nonprosecutorial duties.
Local grievance panels and local grievance counsel can be part-time
and they are appointed by the superior court judges.139 Panel members are
unpaid; grievance counsel are paid by the state. l40 There are one or more
grievance panels in each judicial district of the state141 and currently there
are eight local grievance counsel. Each local panel has three members, two
attorneys and one nonattorney. 142 The panels consider complaints referred
to them of violations by attorneys of the Connecticut Rules of Professional
mately $550,000. Berdan, supra, at 10 n.3. The position of disciplinary counsel and several related
rule changes were to become effective on July 1,2003. CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-83. However, due to
lack of available funding, this was postponed until October I, 2003 and subsequently postponed further
to January I, 2004.
135 See CONN. SUPER. CT. R. §§ 2-29(t), -34A, -47 (setting forth the powers and duties of disci-
Plinarr; counsel).
36 [d. §§ 2-34A(b)(2), -82.
137 Compare CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-34 (repealed July I, 2003) (charging the statewide bar
counsel with certain duties), with id. §§ 2-34, -34A (transferring those duties to the newly created
disciplinary counsel).
138 On this and other benefits of the new rules see Berdan, supra note 134, at 8.
139
CONN. SUPER. CT. R. §§ 2-29(a), -30(a); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 51-90b(a), -9Od(a) (2003).
140 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-9Od(a)(2oo3);CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-30(a).
141 CONN. GEN. STAT. § SI-90b(a) (2003); CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-29(a).
142 CONN. GEN. STAT. § SI-90b(a) (2003); CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-29(a).
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Conduct. 143 The grievance counsel investigates complaints received by
local panels and assists the panels in their consideration of these com-
plaints. 144
A very important feature of the attorney disciplinary and unauthorized
practice enforcement process administered by the state enforcement agen-
cies and officials in Connecticut is that it relies almost entirely on com-
plaints from the bar or other outside sources for the enforcement agencies
and officials to become involved in cases of alleged violation of the law:45
The annual number of attorney disciplinary violation complaints received
by statewide bar counsel alleging violations by attorneys of the Connecti-
cut Rules of Professional Conduct has remained high, in each of the last
seven years ranging between a total of 1,100 and 1,358 new complaints
each year. l46 However, relatively few of these complaints have involved
disciplinary rule violations alleging unauthorized practice, probably no
more than two or three such complaints a year, Unauthorized practice
complaints involving alleged violations of section 51-88 received by state-
wide bar counsel, the official who has been responsible for receiving these
complaints, likewise have been relatively few in number, averaging at
about forty each year. The number of unauthorized practice complaints,
both those alleging attorney disciplinary rule unauthorized practice viola-
tions and those alleging section 51-88 violations, could go up substantially
in the future if the organized bar or others make a major effort to achieve
compliance with unauthorized practice laws.147
143 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-9OI'(a) (2003); CONN. SUPER. Cr. R. § 2-29(e)(I); see also CONN. R.
CT., GRIEVANCE PANEL R. P. I (2003) (setting forth procedures for grievance panel investigation,
hearing and determination of complaints).
144 CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-31; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-9Od(b) (2003).
145 Involvement of the enforcement agencies against a violator, except as a result of an outside
complaint filed with the statewide bar counsel, is rare. A local grievance panel may take action on its
own motion. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-9Oe(a) (2003); CONN. SUPER. Cr. R. §§ 2-29(e)(I), -32(a). This,
however, has seldom occurred. Presumably the statewide grievance committee and statewide bar
counsel may also take enforcement action on their own motion.
146 See Statewide Grievance Committee and Office of the Statewide Bar Counsel, Statistics:
7/1/1997-6130/2003 [hereinafter Statistical Report 1997-2003] (on file with the Connecticut Law Re-
view).
The most common attorney disciplinary offenses alleged in the year 7/1/02-6130/03 were neglect
(397), lack of communication (237), excessive fee (79), misrepresentation (66) and conflict of interest
(55). State of Connecticut Barrnaster, Grievance Statistical Report for 7/01/2002-6/30/2003: Nature of
Complaint (on file with the Connecticut Law Review).
The principal Connecticut Rule of Professional Conduct prohibiting unauthorized practice and re-
lated conduct by Connecticut attorneys is Rule 5.5, a rule that prohibits attorneys from either practicing
law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction or
from assisting nonlawyers in conduct that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. CONN. R.
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5.
147 An alternative to a member of the bar seeking compliance with unauthorized practice laws by
filing a complaint with the statewide bar counsel is for a member of the bar to bring an action in supe-
rior court to restrain violation of section 51-88. CONN. GEN. STAT. § SI-88(c) (2003) (authorizing such
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Complaints of attorney misconduct involving possible violations of the
Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct are initially reviewed by state-
wide bar counsel and most of these complaints are then referred to local
grievance panels for consideration. 148 When a local panel receives a com-
plaint, it makes an investigation and then a probable cause determination,149
usually without holding a formal hearing. If no probable cause is found,
the case is dismissed. ISO Dismissal is final. lsi If probable cause is found, it
is reported to the statewide grievance committee
lS2
and one of its reviewing
committees will then hold a hearing on the matter. JS3 If the reviewing
committee finds probable cause, it imposes a sanction or conditions on the
violator,ls4 or it directs disciplinary counsel to file a presentment in supe-
rior court against the respondent attorney. ISS
If the sanction imposed by a reviewing committee is a reprimand, this
may be appealed by the respondent attorney to the superior court.
IS6
If a
presentment is filed with the superior court, this could result in the court
an action by any member of the state bar in good standing). Another alternative is provided by section
2-47(c) of the Connecticut Superior Court Rules. This rule permits a petition seeking to restrain any
person from engaging in the practice of law to be filed with the superior court. CONN. SUPER. CT. R. §
2-47(c). The petition apparently can be filed by anyone, following which the state's attorney, discipli-
nary counselor any member of the bar may prosecute the complaint at the direction of the court. [d.
148
See CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-32(a), (a)(I); CONN. R. CT., STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMM. R.
2 (authorizing this review and referral).
149 See CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-32(1), (i). On investigations and detenninalions by grievance
panels see also section 51-90(1) of the Connecticut General Statutes.
Local grievance panel investigations and proceedings are confidential unless the attorney under
investigation requests that they be made public. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-90f(b) (2003); CONN. SUPER.
CT. R. § 2-32(g). But detenninations by the panels are matters of public record. CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 51-90f(d) (2003); CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-32(k). Hearings in attorney disciplinary cases held
by the statewide grievance committee or any of its reviewing committees are public and decisions by
these bodies are matters of public record. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 5l-90g(b), (I), (g), -90h(c) (2003);
CONN. SUPER. CT. R. §§ 2-35(c), (e), (i), -36.
Decisions of the statewide grievance committee or of its reviewing committees that issue repri-
mands or order presentments against attorneys for violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct are
periodically summarized by the Connecticut Bar Association's Professional Discipline Committee and
published in Connecticut Lawyer.
ISO CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-32(i).
lSI [d. However, if the complaint alleges commission of a crime by the accused attorney, the
panel's finding of no probable cause, together with supporting documentation, must be submitted to the
statewide grievance committee for further consideration. [d.
IS2 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-90f(d) (2003); CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-32(i).
153 CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-35(c). On review of panel detenninations, see also sections 51-90g
and 51-90h of the Connecticut General Statutes.
The full grievance committee may review and hold hearings on panel detenninations. CONN. SU-
PER. CT. R. § 2-35(c). But these actions by the full committee are rare.
154 [d. § 2-35(e).
ISS [d.; c/, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-90g(d), (e) (2003) (making no mention ofdisciplinary coun-
sel).
156
CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-38.
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imposing a reprimand, suspension, disbarment, or some other sanction on
the attorney if the court finds sufficient cause. tS7
Not all complaints of attorney violation of the Connecticut Rules of
Professional Conduct initially received by statewide bar counsel are re-
ferred to local grievance panels. About twenty percent of these complaints
are screened out by statewide bar counsel and disposed of by statewide bar
counsel in conjunction with others, without local panel participation. ls8
Most of these screened out complaints are dismissed. ls9 Of the more than
one thousand complaints of violation of the Connecticut Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct that the statewide grievance committee, its reviewing
committees and statewide bar counsel decide each year, about eighty-five
to ninety percent of them are dismissed for lack of clear and convincing
evidence. 16O Nearly all of those in which probable cause is found result in a
grievance committee or reviewing committee reprimand or a presentment
to the superior court for determination as to whether a more serious sanc-
tion should be imposed. The annual number of statewide grievance com-
mittee and reviewing committee reprimands recently has averaged about
fifty and the annual number of presentments has been about seventy-five. 161
Until January of 2004, statewide bar counsel was responsible for inves-
tigating and prosecuting complaints of section 51_88. 162 When statewide
bar counsel received a complaint of section 51-88 violation, he investigated
it and recommended to the statewide grievance committee what action
should be taken. Then, following review by the statewide grievance com-
mittee, the complaint is either dismissed, a warning letter sent to the ac-
cused, or proceedings for a restraining order brought in superior court.
Apparently the statewide bar counsel's duties relative to complaints of sec-
IS7
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-90g(e)(2003);CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-47(a).
1S8 Statistical Report 1997-2003, supra note 146. Statewide bar counsel, in initially reviewing all
complaints, screens out those not alleging violation of any Rule of Professional Conduct or otherwise
not meriting local panel referral. Then statewide bar counsel, in conjunction with two other persons
designated by court rule, reviews these complaints and dismisses those considered appropriate for
dismissal. CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-32(a)(2); CONN. GRIEVANCE COMM. R. 2B, 2C. Complainants
may appeal dismissals to a reviewing committee. Id.20. Such of the complaints as allege fee disputes,
if the fees are not clearly excessive or improper, may be stayed pending arbitration or other action.
CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-32(aX3).
IS9 See Statistical Report 1997-2003, supra note 146.
160 See id.
161 Id. In addition to reprimands and presentments, the statewide grievance committee or its re-
viewing committees also impose a few conditions on respondent attorneys each year. Id. On condi-
tions that may be imposed, see Connecticut Superior Court Rule section 2-37.
162 See CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-34(b)(1) (repealed 2003) (the duties of statewide bar counsel in-
clude investigation and prosecution of complaints involving "violation by any person of General Stat-
utes § 51-SS").
Data is not available on what ultimate disposition was made of all the complaints filed with the
statewide grievance committee in recent years alleging section 51-88 violations.
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tion 51-88 violations now will be taken over by disciplinary counsel. 163 A
court rule also pennits the superior court to order prosecution of section
51-88 cases by the state's attorney or any member of the bar.164 And sec-
tion 51-88 also pennits any member of the Connecticut bar in good stand-
ing to petition the superior court to restrain unauthorized practice conduct
prohibited by that statutory section. '6s Data is unavailable on the exact
number of cases that have been filed in court to enforce section 51-88 or
the earlier Connecticut statutes similar to section 51-88. But as is indicated
by the cases cited above in the Connecticut caselaw section,l66 there has
been a scattering of such cases over time resulting in reported opinions that
have helped in clarifying what is and is not prohibited by section 51-88 and
its antecedents.
Despite the structure and process that the state provides for enforcing
Connecticut unauthorized practice laws, noncompliance with those laws is
extensive. Violations are prevalent by some attorneys, both Connecticut
attorneys and out-of-state attorneys not authorized to practice law in Con-
necticut, and by some nonattorneys. Many of the violators are blatantly
disregarding laws that clearly prohibit unauthorized practice conduct. The
conduct of others is less obviously illegal because of ambiguity in the Con-
necticut unauthorized practice laws pertaining to some kinds of legal ser-
vices and some kinds of legal service providers.
Although precise data is lacking on the extent of unauthorized practice
violations, among the more common and prevalent violations appear to be
these: Connecticut attorneys providing legal services in states where they
are not admitted; out-of-state attorneys not admitted in Connecticut provid-
ing such services in Connecticut; house counsel not admitted in Connecti-
cut, but whose principal office is in Connecticut, providing legal services
in Connecticut to their employer; and much of the legal advice, legal
document preparation and transaction negotiation by certain nonattomeys,
most particularly real estate brokers, accountants and accounting firms.
The incidence of unauthorized practice violation also may be considerable
among other nonattorney Connecticut occupations and businesses, among
them commercial banks, savings and loan companies, accounting firms,
real estate brokers, document preparation services, immigration consult-
ants, collection agencies, and some paralegals while working for law finns.
Given the significance that Connecticut unauthorized practice laws are
intended to have on the quality of legal services and the trustworthiness of
163 See id. §§ 2-34A(b)(8), -47(c). However, it should be noted that a Connecticut statute is still
in effect staling that "[s]tate-Wide Bar Counsel shall investigate and prosecute complaints involving the
violation by any person ofany provision of section 51-88." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-90c(b) (2003).
164 CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-47(c).
165 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-88(c)(2003).
166 See supra discussion Part I.D.
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legal service providers, extensive lack of compliance with these laws may
have very negative consequences on the effectiveness of the legal order in
Connecticut.
II. SOME OPTIONS FOR MAKING CHANGES IN CONNECTICUT
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE LAWS
Over time all fields of law need change and Connecticut unauthorized
practice law is no exception to this inevitable need. The purpose of this
section is to point out some of the options that may be considered of merit
when lawmakers or advocates are contemplating making or proposing
change in Connecticut unauthorized practice laws. Most but not all of the
options set out below have been adopted as law by one or more states.
Many factors may lead to change in a field of law, among them change in
the economy, change in prevailing social values and change in the political
influence of affected interest groups. Pressure for change may be intensi-
fied by a single well-publicized event that creates widespread concerns and
demands for legal change. An example of this in the unauthorized practice
field is the California Supreme Court's decision in the Birbrower case,t67 a
case that received extensive publicity and focused the attention of attorneys
in all states on their vulnerability to being sanctioned for unauthorized
practice of law if they engaged in multijurisdictionallaw practice in states
where they were not admitted to practice. Another example is the recent
recommendations of an ABA Commission on MOP for changes in the law
that would, if adopted, drastically increase the legal rights of business firms
and nonlawyer professional firms to move into the legal services field and
provide legal services to clients. 168
The need to make changes in Connecticut unauthorized practice law is
particularly great given the extensive ambiguity and uncertainty in that
law. But even Connecticut unauthorized practice law that is relatively
clear no doubt is believed by many to be in need of change, with some fa-
voring the easing of existing unauthorized practice restrictions and others
favoring broadening and intensifying them. Connecticut courts have an
important and unique responsibility to determine what changes should be
made in unauthorized practice law as they not only have an important role
in shaping that law by court rules and caselaw but in all likelihood also
have the constitutional power to determine what that law ultimately shall
be.
167 Birbrower. Montalbano. Condon & Frank. P.C. v. Superior Court. 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998).
168 On the Commission's recommendations and the responses see infra note 240.
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A. Clarifying the Scope ofJudicial Power Over the Unauthorized
Practice ofLaw
The Connecticut courts should clearly and unequivocally resolve the
constitutional question of the scope of their power over unauthorized prac-
tice of law. This is too important a question to be left unresolved. The
probability is that when the Connecticut courts do clearly resolve this ques-
tion, based on their past decisions, they probably will conclude that their
power over unauthorized law practice is concurrent with the other two
governmental branches but that the courts have ultimate power and their
determinations on unauthorized practice of law matters will prevail if not
in accord with those of either of the other two branches. 169 This appears to
be the majority position of state courts that have clearly decided this ques-
tion. 170 A small minority of state courts have adopted one or the other of
two alternative positions. One of these alternative positions is that a state's
courts have exclusive power over what is or is not the practice of law and
any statute or administrative regulation on unauthorized practice of law is
per se unconstitutiona1. 171 The other position, that apparently a few states
have adopted, is that the courts and the legislature have concurrent consti-
tutional power over the unauthorized practice of law but the legislature's
determinations prevail if the courts and the legislature are not in accord. 172
However, in a substantial minority of states, the position is similar to that
of Connecticut: The courts have not clearly resolved this important power
allocation problem. 173
B. Providing a More Comprehensive and Detailed Definition ofthe
Practice ofLaw
No Connecticut statute or court rule adequately defines the practice of
169 See supra text accompanying note 108.
170
See, e.g., Eckles v. Atlanta Tech. Group, 485 S.E.2d 22, 25-26 (Ga. 1997); Reed v. Labor &
Indus. Relations Comm'n., 789 S.W.2d 19,20 (Mo. 1990); Hulse v. Criger, 247 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Mo.
1952); In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules, 422 S.E.2d 123, 124 (S.C. 1992); In re Burson, 909
S.W.2d 768, 773-75 (Tenn. 1995).
Charles Wolfram, a leading academic authority on the professional responsibility of lawyers, is
opposed to this position, at least as it applies 10 state legislative enaclments, because it enables the
courts to invalidate action of the state's legislature, a branch of government more democratic and re-
sponsive to the citizenry. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 834-35 (1986).
171 See, e.g., In re Creasy, 12 P.3d 214,216,219 (Ariz. 2000); In re Opinion No. 26 of the
Comm. on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 654 A.2d 1344 (N.J. 1995). However, the legislature
may criminalize certain conduct that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. Id. at 1354.
172 See, e.g., State Bar v. Cramer, 249 N.W.2d 1,6-7 (Mich. 1976); cf Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 9
(deferring to the legislature to determine whether arbitration constitutes practice of law under state
stalute).
173 See, e.g., Unauthorized Practice Comm. v. Cortez, 692 S.W.2d 47, 50-51 (Tex. 1985); State
Bar v. Summerhayes & Hayden, 905 P.2d 867, 871 n.l (Utah 1995) (declining to address the power
allocation issue).
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law. Some Connecticut caselaw, as previously mentioned in this article,
has made some attempt at such a definition but these efforts are too general
to be of much assistance in resolving unauthorized practice problems. 174 A
more useful definition is needed applicable to unauthorized practice situa-
tions, and models exist for such a definition. Among these models are
court rules of a few states, of which Washington Supreme Court General
Rule 24 is an excellent example. 175 Some state statutes also include defini-
174 See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
175 Washington Supreme Court General Rule 24 provides as follows:
Definition of the Practice of Law
(a) General Definition: The practice of law is the application of legal principles
and judgment with regard to the circumstances or objectives of another entity or per-
son(s) which require the knowledge and skill of a person trained in the law. This in-
cludes but is not limited to:
(I) Giving advice or counsel to others as to their legal rights or the legal rights or
responsibilities of others for fees or other consideration.
(2) Selection, drafting, or completion of legal documents or agreements which
affect the legal rights of an entity or person(s).
(3) Representation of another entity or person(s) in a court, or in a formal admin-
istrative adjudicative proceeding or other formal dispute resolution process or in an
administrative adjudicative proceeding in which legal pleadings are filed or a record
is established as the basis for judicial review.
(4) Negotiation of legal rights or responsibilities on behalf of another entity or
person(s).
(b) Exceptions and Exclusions: Whether or not they constitute the practice of
law, the following are permitted:
(I) Practicing law authorized by a limited license to practice pursuant to Admis-
sion to Practice Rules 8 (special admission for: a particular purpose or action; indi-
gent representation; educational purposes; emeritus membership; house counsel), 9
(legal interns), 12 (limited practice for closing officers), or 14 (limited practice for
foreign law consultants).
(2) Serving as a court house facilitator pursuant to court rule.
(3) Acting as a lay representative authorized by administrative agencies or tribu-
nals.
(4) Serving in a neutral capacity as a mediator, arbitrator, conciliator, or facilita-
tor.
(5) Participation in labor negotiations, arbitrations or conciliations arising under
collective bargaining rights or agreements.
(6) Providing assistance to another to complete a form provided by a court for
protection under RCW chapters 10.14 (harassment) or 26.50 (domestic violence pre-
vention) when no fee is charged to do so.
(7) Acting as a legislative lobbyist.
(8) Sale oflegal forms in any format.
(9) Activities which are preempted by Federal law.
(10) Serving in a neutral capacity as a clerk or court employee providing informa-
tion to the public pursuant to Supreme Court Order..
(II) Such other activities that the Supreme Court has determined by published
opinion do not constitute the unlicensed or unauthorized practice of law or that have
been permitted under a regulatory system established by the Supreme Court.
(c) Nonlawyer Assistants: Nothing in this rule shall affect the ability of
nonlawyer assistants to act under the supervision of a lawyer in compliance with
Rule 5.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(d) General Information: Nothing in this rule shall affect the ability of a person
or entity or provide information of a general nature about the law and legal proce-
dures to members of the public.
(e) Governmental agencies: Nothing in this rule shall affect the ability of a gov-
ernmental agency to carry out responsibilities provided by law.
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tions of the practice of law·76 and an ABA Task Force has recently pro-
posed such a definition. 177 Adoption in Connecticut of a definition similar
to the Washington one merits serious consideration. The Washington defi-
nition is comprehensive, appears in one readily available rule, and some of
the more difficult unauthorized practice problems are resolved in the listing
that follows the more general description of activities that constitute the
practice of law. No definition can resolve or should attempt to resolve all
possible unauthorized practice problems but a combined broad and detailed
definition makes available the high degree of clarity, certainty and notice to
affected interests that the law of unauthorized law practice very much
needs.
C. Options for Adding Nonattorney Exemptions or Restrictions to
Connecticut Unauthorized Practice Laws
An alternative to a definitional law that broadly defines the practice of
law that nonattorneys may not engage in and then adds a comprehensive
list of exemptions and restrictions is to add these exemptions and restric-
tions in a series of separate laws over time. All states to some extent have
adopted this latter approach, with many of the separate laws being directed
at only one particular nonattorney occupation. Caselaw opinions have
been the most common form of these separate and more particularized laws
but many states have also adopted a scattering of separate and narrowly-
focused statutes, court rules and executive agency regulations, each law
(I) Professional Standards: Nothing in this rule shall be taken to define or affect
standards for civil liability or professional responsibility.
WASH. CT. R., R. GEN. ApP. R. 24 (emphasis omitted); cf ARJz. R. SUP. CT. R. 31 (a general definition
and extensive list of exceptions; also defines unauthorized practice of law); D.C. CT. ApP. R. 49(a)-(c)
(a general definition of practice of law followed by exceptions to prohibited activities and then com-
ments helping to explain the rule's meaning); VA. SUP. C. R. 6:1-6-1 (providing a more detailed listing
of what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law than does the Washington rule).
176 See, e.g., ALA. CODE, § 34-3-6 (2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 481.02 (West 2oo2)(stating legal
service activities restricted to attorneys licensed in Minnesota, then followed by an extended list of
exceptions and some additional restrictions).
177 MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW (Draft 9/18/02), available at
http://www.abanet.orgtcpr/model_deCdefinition.html(last visited Nov. 13, 2003) (on file with the
Connecticut Law Review). The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have op-
posed the ABA task force's definition as anticompetitive and anticonsumer. See Jenna Greene, Prac-
tice ofLaw Definition Sparks Ire, CONN. L. TRIB., Feb. 3, 2003, at I.
The ABA task force eventually did not recommend its definition to the ABA. ABA TASK FORCE
ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW, REPORT TO THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 3
(Aug. 2003) available at http://www.abanet.orglcpr/rnodel-def/taskforceJpt_803.pdf (last visited Sept.
24,2003) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review). The Task Force eventually concluded
that the necessary balancing test for determining who should be permitted to provide
services that are included within the definition of the practice of law is best done at
the state level. . .. The Task Force acknowledges that each jurisdiction will weigh
the factors provided in the framework in a manner that is best suited to resolving the
harm/benefit equation for its citizens.
Id.
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applicable to only one nonattorney occupation or to only certain limited
law practice activities. This approach provides almost endless options for
filling in the gaps in unauthorized practice laws and for deleting or revising
unauthorized practice laws that lawmakers consider in need of change. It
is, however, less likely to consistently and appropriately balance broader
regulatory needs than would the definitional approach discussed in the sec-
tion just above. 178 Also, because of the restricted coverage of each separate
law and the sporadic nature of the adoption process, the more comprehen-
sive and detailed definitional approach probably has more potential for
filling in unauthorized practice law gaps.
Over the years Connecticut lawmakers have adopted a rather skimpy
set of laws providing limited and particularized exceptions and restrictions
as to unauthorized practice of law by nonattorneys. The most common and
important source of these Connecticut laws is the reported judicial opinions
of Connecticut courts. Some exceptions and restrictions have come from
other sources but surprisingly few as to nonattorneys and almost none by
statute or court rule. 179 Given the extent of legal service activity in Con-
necticut in apparent violation of Connecticut unauthorized practice laws
and the variety of legal service providers, the number of reported Con-
necticut judicial opinions involving alleged unauthorized practice of law by
nonattorneys has been relatively small-fewer than two dozen such opin-
ions exist. And, as noted earlier, some of the older opinions also are of
questionable authority today due to changed conditions and changes in
prevailing values since the opinions were decided. 180
One obvious means of providing needed clarification and revision to
Connecticut unauthorized practice laws concerning nonattorney legal ser-
vice activities is for Connecticut lawmakers to adopt an expanded number
of more particularized exceptions and revisions to the state's unauthorized
practice laws. There are numerous options available for enriching these
Connecticut laws in this manner. The courts, the legislature, and many
state administrative agencies may make contributions to this clarification
and revision. 181 But if the courts take action, the court rule approach has a
major advantage over the judicial opinion approach in that for the courts to
178 See supra discussion Part II.B.
179 For an example of a court rule exception to unauthorized practice by nonattomeys, see Con-
necticut Superior Court Rules sections 3-14 to ·21, which limit the court appearance rights granted to
law students. On nonlawyer exceptions and restrictions by Connecticut executive agency regulations.
see sUfera notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
80 See supra discussion Part 1.0.1.
181 The Connecticut courts eventually may unequivocally conclude that their constitutional power
over unauthorized practice oflaw is concurrent but ultimately superior to that of the other two branches
of government. See supra notes 105·109 and accompanying text. This would mean that any unauthor-
ized practice of law clarifications and revisions by the legislature or executive agencies would be sub-
ject to invalidation by the courts if the courts disagreed with them.
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act it is not necessary to wait for a case to be filed that raises a nonattorney
unauthorized practice problem. 182
Considered below are some of the detailed unauthorized practice law
restriction and exception options that Connecticut lawmakers may con-
clude merit adoption when clarification or revision of Connecticut unau-
thorized practice laws applicable to nonattorneys is being contemplated.
Most of the options described below have been adopted as law in one or
more states. A few have been proposed by concerned interest groups or
respected commentators. In some states options are included in the same
court rule or statute that defines the practice of law. 183
1. Exemptions Frequently Granted to Major Nonlawyer Service
Occupations
In many states certain major nonattorney service occupations whose
work often includes legal services are given special exemptions from the
states' unauthorized practice laws. Among major service occupations that
frequently have been granted such exemptions are accountants, real estate
brokers and salespersons, title insurance companies, insurance adjusters,
and paralegals. Connecticut law has almost no unauthorized practice spe-
cial exemptions for any of these major service occupations. 184 Obviously,
exemptions of this kind are an important option available to Connecticut
lawmakers when in the future they consider making changes in the state's
unauthorized practice laws. A policy justification that has been advanced
for granting such exemptions is that from their experience, training, and
standards of work performance, the exempted occupations are qualified to
provide some legal services to others and to do so in a competent and
trustworthy manner. 18S As to several of the occupations, state licensing or
certifying adds to the likelihood that the legal services work they perform
will be at an acceptable level of competence and trustworthiness. 186 A sig-
182 New Jersey has an unusual procedure that has increased the number of important unauthorized
practice cases brought before the New Jersey Supreme Court. Pursuant to a court rule, the New Jersey
Supreme Court appoints members of an Unauthorized Practice Committee that, among other duties,
issues advisory opinions on unauthorized practice to anyone requesting such an opinion. Any ag-
grieved person may then obtain review of that opinion by petitioning the Supreme Court. The New
Jersey Attorney General is charged with responding and opposing the review petition. N.J. R. GEN.
ApP. R. 1:22-1(a), -2(a), -3A. There is a similar committee for professional ethics, with similar review
of its advisory opinions by the New Jersey Supreme Court. Id. I: 19.
183 See supra discussion Part II.B.
184 But see Kiniry v. Degutis, 18 Conn. Supp. 186 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1953) (holding an accountant
not to have engaged in the practice of law when negotiating a federal government tax claim settlement
and holding the accountant entitled to a fee for his services).
185 See, e.g., In re N.J. Soc'y ofCPAs, 507 A.2d 711, 717 (N.J. 1986) (considering the exemption
ofCPAs).
186 See, e.g., VA. SUP. C. R. 6:1-5-8 (referring only to CPAs).
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nificant contributing factor to the above-listed occupations receiving some
special exemption from many states' unauthorized practice laws presuma-
bly is the political influence of these occupations. All of the above listed
exempted occupations, except paralegals, can assert considerable political
pressure in efforts to achieve their goals and most exemptions for parale-
gals are likely to be backed by attorneys, another politically influential
group.
The legal exemptions from state unauthorized practice laws granted to
major nonattorney service occupations in some states are generally quite
specific and limited. There are many examples of this. For instance, by
the law of some states, real estate brokers are expressly authorized to draft
or fill in certain legal documents pertaining to real estate transactions in
which they are acting as brokers. 187 Some state laws also expressly permit
real estate brokers to close those real estate transactions in which they are
acting as brokers. 188 Similar legal document drafting or form completion
authorization that some states expressly grant to real estate brokers are
extended to title insurance companies in a few states. 189 And there are state
187 See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVI, § I (authorizing licensed real estate brokers to fill out es-
sential documents for real estate transactions when acting as brokers, salespersons or agents); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 481.02(3a) (West 2002) (stating that a real estate broker may draft "papers incident to the
sale, trade, lease, or loan of property[;]" they also may charge for these services except as provided by
the state supreme court but the state supreme court has imposed no charging restrictions); VA. SUP. CT.
R. 6:1-6-103(3) (stating that "[a] real estate agent, or his regular employee, involved in the negotiation
of a transaction and incident to the regular course of conducting his licensed business, may prepare a
contract of sale, exchange, option or lease with respect to such transaction, for which no separate
charge shall be made"); WASH. CT. R. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 12(d) (permitting nonattomeys,
upon passing a special examination, to be certified as closing officers who may "select, prepare and
complete documents in a form previously approved by the [Limited Practice] Board for use in closing a
loan, extension of credit, sale or other transfer of real or personal property"); Pope County Bar Ass'n v.
Suggs, 624 S.W.2d 828 (Ark. 1981) (holding that a real estate broker may fill in the blanks of standard-
ized printed forms in connection with simple real estate transactions for which the fonn preparer is
acting as broker and is not charging for filling in the blanks, provided that the broker's principal has
declined to hire a lawyer and provided that the broker does not render advice about the legal effects of
such forms); cf In re Opinion No. 26 of the Comm. on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 654 A.2d
1344 (N.J. 1995) (holding that a real estate broker may conduct closing and settlement proceedings
without the presence of attorneys as long as the broker notifies the parties of the potential conflict of
interest). The New Jersey Supreme Court's carefully reasoned Opinion 26 decision is concerned only
with real estate brokers and title companies but the approach it takes-infonned consent following a
detailed notice prescribed by law---could be extended to other occupations as well. So extended, and if
widely adopted by U.S. states, it would have a tremendous effect on unauthorized practice law in this
country. Much of what is now unauthorized practice would be exempted from unauthorized practice
restrictions if consent by the clients occurred following prescribed notice to the clients.
188 E.g., In re Opinion No. 26 of the Comm. on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 654 A.2d at
1361-62; cf, OR. REv. STAT. § 9.166(2) (stating that licensed real estate brokers in arranging real estate
transactions are not engaged in the unauthorized practice oflaw).
189 E.g., In re Opinion No. 26 of the Comm. on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 654 A.2d at
1358 n.4; State Bar v. Guardian Abstract & Title Co., 587 P.2d 1338 (N.M. 1978) (holding that a title
insurance and abstract company can legally fill in blanks in statutory and other land transaction forms
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laws expressly exempting accountants, particularly certified public ac-
countants, from state unauthorized practice laws for certain legal service
activities, especially state or local government tax return preparation and
appearances before a state or local government nonjudicial tax adjudicatory
body.\90 The federal government has authorized many accountants and
others, in their representation of clients, to appear before the U.S. Internal
Revenue Service and the U.S. Tax Court. Insurance adjusters are still an-
other major service occupation that some states have expressly granted
limited exemption from the state's unauthorized practice laws. \91 Parale-
gals, sometimes referred to as legal assistants, are another important nonat-
torney legal service occupation often granted unauthorized practice exemp-
prepared by attorneys but the company cannot give legal advice as to the language of the fonns or
which form should be used).
190
E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-27-11(7) (2002) states that:
Nothing in §§ 11-27-5 [to] 11-27-11 [unauthorized practice sections] shall be con-
strued to limit or prevent: . .. (7) Any certified public accountant or member of the
American Institute of Accountants from appearing or acting as a representative of
another person before any federal, state, or municipal department, board, division,
department, commission, agency or any body other than a court, authorized or con-
stituted by law to determine any question of fact, affecting the imposition or adjust-
ment of taxes or regarding any financial or accounting maner, or from preparing for
or on behalfof another person any federal, state, or municipal return or report of any
nature or description, or advising another person in relation to the preparation of any
such retum or report.
Id.; see also id. § 11-27-11(9) (2002) (stating that a public accountant may advise a taxpayer in connec-
tion with the imposition or adjustment of taxes and extensive authority is granted to public accountants
and others to prepare on behalf of taxpayers federal, state or municipal personal income tax returns);
VA. SUP. CT. R. 6: 1-5-8 (extensively restricting nonattomeys as to permissible tax practice). The rule
adds:
Nothing herein is intended to modify or limit the right of a certified public account-
ant to certify, attest or express an opinion that financial data comply with conditions
established by law or contract. Certified public accountants are members of a pro-
fession regulated by law who must meet certain minimal education requirements and
observe certain rules of professional conduct. As such, certified public accountants
engaged in the practice of their profession are entitled to a greater degree of latitude
in the resolution of issues involving overlapping legal and accounting principles.
Id.; In re N.J. Soc'y ofCPAs, 507 A.2d 711, 716-17 (N.J. 19S6)(holding that, subject to certain restric-
tions, certified public accountants may prepare New Jersey inheritance tax retums); see a/so 31 C.F.R.
§ 10.3 (2003) (statins that attomeys, certified public accountants, enrolled agents, and enrolled actuar-
ies may practice before the U.S. Internal Revenue Service). Although the states have no legal right to
control who may appear before federal agencies or courts, there are states that have included among the
exemptions from their unauthorized practice laws such representation before federal tax bodies by
certain persons. See, e.g., VA. SUP. CT. R. 6:1-5-101; cf, R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-27-11(7)(2002).
\9\ Insurance adjusters licensed or certified by the state, on behalf of an insurer, policyholder or
claimant, may direct the investigation, negotiation or settlement of an insurance policy claim in some
states. E.g., IND. STATS. ANN. § 27-1-27-1, -2 (Michie 1999); 63 PA. CONS. STATS. ANN. §§ 1601,
1602 (West 1996) (allowing for settlement but the statute does not entitle a licensed public adjuster to
negotiate settlements on behalfof insured claimants against alleged tortfeasors or their insurers); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 3IA-26·102, -201 (2001); VA. SUP. CT. R. 6:1-2 (setting forth a detailed listing ofser-
vices that lay adjusters may and may not provide their principals, including limited investigations,
settlement negotiation and document preparation). BUI see IND. CODE. ANN. § 27-1-9(1) (Michie 1999)
(stating that a certified public adjuster may not practice law).
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tions. 192 But paralegals are unique in the scope of their exemption from
unauthorized practice laws if they are working for attorneys. Most all
paralegals work for one or more attorneys, are supervised by the attorneys,
and the attorneys assume responsibility for the paralegals' work perform-
ance. 193
Paralegals are the attorneys' legal assistants. As legal assistants, para-
legals are legally authorized to perform nearly all legal services except
court appearances and appearances before most administrative agencies.
But to be exempt from unauthorized practice laws they must be adequately
supervised by an attorney and the supervising attorney must be responsible
for their work. 194 The obvious reason for paralegals being granted such
extensive exemption from unauthorized practice laws is that the required
supervision and responsibility assumption by the attorney is considered
sufficient assurance that the legal services provided by the paralegals will
be competent. A supplemental reason is that a client's legal fees will often
192 For a definition ofa legal assistant see New Mexico Court Rule 20-102A. A mid-1980s study
of paralegals estimated that at that time. in U.S. law offices. there was on average one paralegal for
every eight attorneys working in those offices. QUINTIN JOHNSTONE & MARTIN WENGLINSKY. PARA-
LEGALS: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS OF A SATELLITE OCCUPATION 4 (1985). If this ratio is still in
effect. and something close to it probably is. there are at least 100.000 paralegals providing legal ser-
vices in U.S. law offices today. On growth of the paralegal profession. see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA-
TION COMMISSION ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE. NONLAWYER ACTIVITY IN LAW-RELATED SITUATIONS:
A REpORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 51-52 (1995).
193 In the 1990s there was a movement with substantial support to legally permit paralegals, inde-
pendently of attorneys, to provide extensive legal services to others in designated fields of law. Bills
were introduced in a dozen or so state legislatures permitting independent practice by paralegals.
Under most of the proposals the paralegals, usually referred to as legal technicians, were required to
pass an examination in a particular field of law to be qualified to practice independently in that field.
None of these bills passed except one in 1991 in Minnesota which authorized "delivery of legal ser-
vices by a specialized legal assistant in accordance with a specialty license issued by the supreme court
before July I. 1995." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 481.02(3XI4) (West 2002). The Minnesota Supreme Court
has not issued any licenses pursuant to the statute. What Ever Happened in Minnesota, FACTS AND
FINDINGS, Vol. 21, No.4, at 50 (1994). A California statute authorizing nonattorneys to be state certi-
fied as document preparation assistants or unlawful detainer assistants permits some legal services for
others to be performed by persons who could be categorized as paralegals. See CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 6400 (West 2003).
Considerable support still exists in some quarters for permitting qualified paralegals. operating
independently of attorneys. to practice in some fields of law. On the independent paralegal movement.
see Deborah Chalfie & James N. Parson. Should Legal Technicians be Allowed to Practice Independ-
ently?, A.B.A. 1., Mar. 1991, at 40; Quintin Johnstone, Lawyer Obligations to Moderate-Income Per-
sons, 21 CAP. U. L. REv. 845, 847-52 (1992); Diane Patrick. The State of Regulation, LEGAL ASSIS-
TANT TODAY, May-June 1993, at 90; Carl M. Selinger, The Retention of Limitations on the Out-of-
Court Practice ofLaw by Independent Paralegals, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 879 (1996) (recommend-
ing thatfaralegals specialize in a single area of the law in an effort to regulate nonlawyer practice).
19 On an attorney's responsibility for the conduct of nonlawyer assistants. see Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 5.3 (2003). For a more detailed consideration of this responsibility, see, for
example, State v. Barrett, 483 P.2d 1106 (Kan. 1971) (disbarring lawyer for not properly supervising
his lay staff members and other violations of professional conduct); N.M. CT. R. 20-101, -114 (govern-
ing legal assistant services).
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be lower if some of the legal work for the client is performed by paralegals
rather than attorneys. 195 A few state courts have provided an extensive list
of permissible and prohibited paralegal legal services. l96 Such a list aids
both attorneys and paralegals in ascertaining the legal scope of services
that paralegals may legally perform, assuming proper attorney supervision
and assumption of responsibility for the paralegals' work.
2. Miscellaneous Exemptions
A miscellany of limited exemptions from unauthorized practice laws
has been adopted by some states, exemptions other than those adopted in
Connecticut or discussed in the preceding section. None of these exemp-
tions has been adopted by more than a few states. Examples appear below.
From this varied set of exemptions, lawmakers in Connecticut may con-
clude that some of these merit adoption in Connecticut. Most of the ex-
emptions have been adopted by state statute or court rule. A number of
them permit designated nonattorney occupations or businesses to provide
specified legal services without being in violation of unauthorized practice
laws. Examples are these: any bona fide labor organization may give legal
advice to its members in matters arising out of the members' employ-
ment; 197 lending institutions may prepare deeds of trust or mortgages on
real estate securing payment of their loans; 198 an arresting police officer
may prosecute traffic offenses in a magistrate's or municipal court; 199 and
legislative lobbyists are not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
when acting as lobbyists.2OO Additional examples are that state registered
document preparation assistants and unlawful detainer assistants are ex-
empted from unauthorized practice laws when performing their authorized
duties;201 newspapers may publish legal questions and answers made by a
195 For a judicial statement supportive of this reason, New Mexico's Rules Governing Legal As-
sistant Service consider:
[i]ncreasing the availability of legal services to the public at a cost the public can af-
ford is a goal of the legal profession .. " The employment of legal assistants is a
particularly significant means by which lawyers can render legal services more eco-
nomically, in greater volume and with maximum efficiency while maintaining the
quality oflegal services.
N.M. R.Gov. LEGAL ASST. SER. R. 20-101.
196 E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6450 (West 2003) (effective Jan. 1,2004); N.H. SuP. CT. R.,
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES R. 35; Provisional Order No. 18,454 A.2d 1222 (R.I. 1983); cf ABA MODEL
GUIDELINES FOR THE UTILIZATION OF LEGAL ASSISTANT SERVICES GUIDELINE 2, cmt. (1991).197 .
E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 481.02(3)(5) (West 2002).
198 E.g., VA. SUP. CT. R. 6:1-6-103 (but no separate charge shall be made for this service).
199 E.g.,ln re Unauthorized Practice Rules, 422 S.E.2d 123, 125 (S.C. 1992).
200
E.g., WASH. CT. R., GEN. R. 24(b)(7).
201
E.g., CAL. BuS. & PROF. CODE § 6400 (West 2003).
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licensed attorney;202 and nonattorney real property managers may represent
landlords in uncontested evictions for nonpayment of rent for residential
properties.203 In some states, too, nonattorney officers or designated em-
ployees of certain organizations, such as corporations, may represent the
organization in certain court proceedings,204 or prepare legal instruments
for use by the organization.20s Another set of exemptions applies to anyone
who performs certain kinds of legal services-no specified occupational,
employment or licensing restrictions as to the service provider. Examples
are serving as an arbitrator or mediator;206 participation in labor negotia-
tions, arbitrations or conciliations arising under collective bargaining rights
or agreements;207 limited oral communications to assist a person in the
completion of blanks on a legal form approved by the state's supreme
court;208 and drafting a will for a person faced with imminent death when
there is not sufficient time available to seek the drafting services of an at-
torney.209
A special comment is in order here on relieving the serious shortage of
legal services available to the poor by permitting nonattorneys to provide
these services.2IO One important way of encouraging nonattomeys to pro-
202
E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 481.02(3XII) (West 2002).
203 See, e.g., Florida Bar re Nonlawyer Representation, 627 So. 2d 485 (1993) (holding that real
property managers are those persons responsible for day-to-day management of residential rental prop-
erty).
204
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., Bus. OCC. & PROF. § 10-206(b)(4) (2000); cf MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 481.02(3)(15) (West 2000) (stating that sole shareholders of a corporation may appear on behalf of
the corporation in court); N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAw § 478 (McKinney 2003); N.Y. NOT-fOR-PROFIT
CORP. LAW § 1403 (McKinney 1997) (stating that officers of societies for prevention of cruelty to
animals may prefer complaints in any court or tribunal for violation of any law concerning cruelty to
animals and may aid in presenting the law and facts to such court or tribunal).
205
E.g., VA. SUP. CT. R. 6:1-6-103.
206
E.g., WASH. CT. R., GEN. R. 24(bX4).
207 E.g., id. R. 24(b)(5).
208 E.g., FLA. BAR REG. R. 10-2.1 (a) (noting that a disclosure form must be signed by the nonat-
tomey and the assisted person whenever such aid is provided).
209
E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 481.02(3)(II)(West 2002).
210 On the unmet civil legal needs of low-income households in Connecticut, see a recent statisti-
cal study, University of Connecticut Center for Survey Research and Analysis, Civil Legal Needs
Among Low-Income Households in Connecticut (April 2003), available at http://www.cbf.ctbar.orgl
LNSreport.pdf(last visited Nov. 13,2003) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review). The study was
sponsored by the Connecticut Bar Foundation. The study is based on extended telephone interviews
with a sample of 401 heads of households in Connecticut with incomes at or below 125 percent of the
federal poverty level. Based on responses from these interviews, the study's findings, among others,
were that in the last year low-income Connecticut households had an average of 2.7 civil legal prob-
lems and legal help from an attorney was obtained by these households for only ten percent of the legal
problems encountered. Of those seeking outside legal help, one-third contacted a legal aid organiza-
tion. Thirty percent of all the households with legal problems were unaware of the availability of legal
aid. The civil legal problems reported by households and the percentage of households reporting each
type of problem were problems related to housing (e.g., discrimination, utility cutoffs, landlord neglect
to make repairs), thirty-five percent; consumer law (e.g., credit card payments, harassment by credi-
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vide such services is exempting them from unauthorized practice restric-
tions when providing legal services to the poor. There is some support for
this approach211 but little adoption in the law. In a few communities such
help is legally available and utilized by a large number of poor people,
especially in making assistance available so that these people may better
represent themselves pro se.212 Also, certain of the exemptions from unau-
thorized practice laws that some states have adopted presumably are aimed
in part at enhancing available legal assistance to the underrepresented
poor.213 The major argument against legally authorizing nonattomeys to
provide legal services to the poor is the risk of inferior representation, even
if the services are provided gratuitously. There also is the concern that if
the nonattomeys charge clients for the services rendered, many of the cli-
ents, especially those with no familiarity with the legal services market,
will be grossly overcharged. One means of alleviating the shortage of legal
services available to the poor is legally authorizing and then expanding
limited attorney assistance to persons representing themselves pro se. Un-
der this format individuals represent themselves but receive some guidance
or other help from attorneys in doing SO.214
3. More Explicit Restrictions
Exemptions are not the only option available to Connecticut lawmakers
in amplifying and clarifying Connecticut unauthorized practice laws. Con-
necticut lawmakers may also take the opposite approach and add express
legal restrictions on the legal service activities of nonattorneys. There are
several possible benefits to such explicit legal restrictions. They can be
helpful in setting conceptual boundary lines between what is and is not the
tors), thirty percent; employment (e.g., payor benefits, job discrimination), twenty-four percent; liveli-
hood issues (e.g., social security, retirement, food stamps), twenty-one percent; elderly and disabled
issues (e.g., disability benefits, will preparation), sixteen percent; family issues (e.g., child support,
divorce), fifteen percent; health care (e.g., Medicaid, Medicare), twelve percent; children at risk (e.g.,
child expelled or suspended from school, child neglect investigation), nine percent; immigration, two
percent. Id. at 6, 26.
211 See, e.g., Recommendations of the Conference on the Delivery of Legal Services to Low-
Income Persons: Professional and Ethical Issues, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1751, 1762-66 (1999).
212 See Alex J. Hurder, Nonlawyer Legal Assistance and Access to Justice, 67 FORDHAM L. REv.
2241, 2241-42 (1999); cf Jona Goldschmidt, How Are Courts Handling Pro Se Litigants, JUDICATURE,
July-Aug. 1998, at 13 (including a consideration of how courts and the bar are and should be assisting
pro se litigants).
213 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6401 (West 2003) (listing unauthorized practice exemp-
tions for state registered document preparation assistants and unlawful detainer assistants); FLA. BAR
REG. R. 10.2.1 (a) (noting that it is not the unauthorized practice of law to orally aid others in filling out
certain legal forms).
214 On the reasons for pro se litigation and possibilities for attorney assistance short of full repre-
sentation, see William Hornsby, Defining the Role of Lawyers in Pro Se Litigation, JUDGES J., Fall
2002, at 5 (noting that pro se litigants are not always poor, but may have other reasons for choosing to
represent themselves).
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unauthorized practice of law; they can act as both reminders and warnings
to those persons engaging in or contemplating engaging in certain activities
that are the unauthorized practice of law; and they can greatly facilitate the
process of enforcing unauthorized practice laws.
There are numerous examples of more explicit restrictions on nonat-
torney legal service activities in the laws of other states that in their explicit
form do not appear in the laws ofConnecticut. A listing that is not exhaus-
tive appears below. Some of these may merit consideration by Connecticut
lawmakers when contemplating changing or clarifying Connecticut unau-
thorized practice laws. Many of the restrictions are directed at particular
major occupations and businesses and prohibit these occupations and busi-
nesses from providing certain specified legal services to their clients. Ex-
amples are that title insurance companies may not engage in title searches
and preparation of title documents without their work being directly super-
vised by attorneys/IS nonattorney financial planners may not give legal
advice to their clients or prepare legal documents for their c1ients,216 nonat-
torney insurance adjusters may not engage in third-party insurance adjust-
ing,217 and first-party insurance adjusters (public adjusters) may not provide
services requiring legal skill.218 Among other occupations and businesses
on which explicit legal service restrictions have been imposed by the laws
of some states are immigration consultants or assistants,219 debt collec-
tors,220 and independent paralegals-those paralegals not supervised by an
21S E.g., Doe v. McMaster, 585 S.E.2d 773, 776-77 (S.C. 2003).
216 E.g., Trumbull County Bar Ass'n. v. Hanna, 684 N.E.2d 329 (Ohio 1997).
217 See, e.g., Utah State Bar v. Summerhayes & Hayden, 905 P.2d 867, 870 (Utah 1995) (stating
that "[i]n third-party adjusting, an adjuster represents an injured client in making a claim under a liabil-
ity insurance contract against an insurance company that insures or indemnifies a third person who is or
may be liable for the injury caused to the adjuster's client"). To adequately serve the client's interests,
the third party adjuster must have knowledge of the law to determine damage liability and make settle-
ment calculations. Id.
218 See, e.g., Linder v. Insurance Claims Consultants, 560 S.E.2d 612, 615, 621 (S.C. 2002)
(holding that, in first party adjusting, the adjuster represents the insured in a claim for insurance, and
may not interpret the policy for their clients, advise clients on acceptance of insurance company settle-
ment offers, be involved in policy coverage disputes or engage in advertising indicating they provide
services requiring legal skill).
219 E.g., ILL. STATS. COMPo ANN. 505/2AA(jX5) (West 1999) (stating that those providing immi-
gration services shall not give "any legal advice concerning an immigration matter"); OR. REv. STATS.
§ 9.280 (2001); Florida Bar v. Matus, 528 So. 2d 895, 896 (Fla. 1988).
220E.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-123 (Michie 1999) (stating that nonattomey debt collectors
may not engage in conduct deemed the practice of law, including giving legal advice); State ex rei
Norvell v. Credit Bureau of Albuquerque, Inc., 514 P.2d 40,49-50 (N.M. 1973) (holding that a collec-
tion agency engaged in the illegal practice of law by taking assignments of claims not for the purpose
of acquiring title and ownership, but rather to facilitate the furnishing of legal services for considera-
tion); cf Pisarello v. Adm'r Servo Corp., 464 So. 2d 917, 919 (La. App. 1985) (holding that nonattomey
debt collectors may not give advice, and the defendant collection agency was not liable in damages to
the creditor-client for not informing him that an account submitted for collection was no longer valid
because doing so would have been the illegal practice of law).
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attorney and for whose work no attorney is responsible.221 Some states
have also explicitly imposed unauthorized practice restrictions on nonat-
tomeys representing parties in arbitration proceedings222 and on notaries
public completing legal forms.223
D. Adding Attorney Unauthorized Practice Exemptions or Restrictions
Many attorneys provide legal services in states where they are not li-
censed to practice. This multijurisdictional practice includes many out-of-
state attorneys rendering services in Connecticut and many Connecticut
attorneys rendering such services in other states. If court appearances are
required by the attorney, pro hac vice requirements are usually sought and
obeyed. For other kinds of services, such as consultation, negotiation or
taking of depositions, the attorney acting where not admitted is often in
violation of unauthorized practice laws. The 1998 Birbrower decision in
California became a wake-up call to the bar everywhere that legal restric-
tions on multijurisdictional practice may be enforced.224
Not long after the Birbrower decision, the American Bar Association,
through an ABA Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice, began con-
sideration of proposals for legally expanding permissible multijurisdic-
tional law practice, proposals it hoped would receive widespread support
by state bar associations and state courts. The proposals that the Commis-
sion ultimately came up with include major changes in Rule 5.5 of the
ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct that, when and if adopted by
221 See, e.g., Sussman v. Grado, 746 N.Y.S.2d 548, 550-53 (2002) (holding that an independent
paralegal engaged in unauthorized praclice of law in drafting a legal document and giving legal advice
without the supervision of an attorney); Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Coats, 786 N.E.2d 449 (Ohio 2003)
(holding that an independent paralegal engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by representing
olhers before the Ohio Bureau of Employment services and drafting divorce complaints and judgment
entries for pro se litigants); if. Florida Bar v. Neiman, 816 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 2002) (holding that a nonat-
tomey engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by performing, without attorney supervision, all of
the legal work except court appearances in numerous cases-in 1995 alone his salary for law-related
activities was $1.4 million).
222 See, e.g., Florida Bar re Nonlawyer Representation, 696 So.2d 1178, 1181 (Fla. 1997) (hold-
ing that compensated nonattorney representation in securities arbitration is the unauthorized practice of
law).
223 See, e.g., Lorain County Bar Ass'n v. Kennedy, 766 N.E.2d lSI, 151-52 (Ohio 2002) (holding
that a notary public engaged in unauthorized practice oflaw by filling out quitclaim deed forms).
224 See Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, p.e. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d I, 8-10, 13
(Cal. 1998). On multijurisdictional practice see also Symposium, Ethics and the Multijurisdictional
Practice of Law, 36 S. TEX. L REv. 657 (1995); William T. Barker, Extrajurisdictional Practice of
Lawyers, 56 BUS. LAw. 1501,1502-03, 1511-15 (2001); Quintin Johnstone, Multijurisdictional Prac-
tice of Law: Its Prevalence and Its Risks, 74 CONN. BJ. 343, 343-47, 358-59 (2000) (reviewing a
Connecticut Bar Foundation Symposium on multijurisdictional practice); Gary A. Munneke, Multi-
jurisdictional Practice of Law: Recent Developments in the National Debate, 27 J. LEGAL PROF. 91,
99-112 (2002-3).
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the states, would enhance and to some extent clarify the legal services that
out-of-state attorneys can legally perform in states where they are not li-
censed to practice law. In mid-2002 the ABA House of Delegates adopted
the Commission's proposed changes in Model Rule 5.5 and recommended
that these changes be adopted as binding law by the states.22S No doubt
some states will adopt the revisions in Rule 5.5 and others will not,226 The
issue is highly controversial within the bar. In Connecticut the ultimate
decision on adoption will be made by the Connecticut Superior Court
judges. The ABA's revision of Model Rule 5.5 is not the only possible
change that can be made in that rule. Other variations in the rule are possi-
ble that are more or less restrictive than the ABA's revision.227 There also
are a few states with court rules or statutes that long have permitted some
limited out-of-state attorney legal service activity in the state, other than
court appearances requiring pro hac vice admission, without that activity
constituting the unauthorized practice oflaw.228
An important subsidiary problem in multijurisdictionallaw practice in-
225 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L. CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2003). The ABA's 2002 adoption of revisions in
R. 8.5, among other changes to that rule, adds this language: "A lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction
is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the lawyer provides or offers to provide
any le~1 services in this jurisdiction." /d. R. 8.5(a).
26 As of November 2003 the following states had adopted Rule 5.5 in the same or very similar
language to that of ABA Model Rule 5.5, as revised in 2002: Colorado, Delaware. Nevada (but requires
registration), New Jersey, North Carolina and South Dakota. E-mail from John Holtaway, ABA Center
for Professional Responsibility (Nov. 18,2003,3:17 EST) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review).
Many other states have adoption of Rule 5.5 under active consideration. fd.
227 See, e.g.• supra note 104 (stating the variations proposed by CBA committees and those by a
CBA task force).
228 See, e.g., MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 600.916 (West 2001) (stating that "[a] person shall not
practice law ... unless the person is regularly licensed and authorized to practice law in this state....
This section does not apply to a person who is duly licensed and authorized to practice law in another
state while temporarily in this state and engaged in a particular matter."); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-27-13
(2002). This Rhode Island law states that the unauthorized practice of law:
shall not apply to visiting attorneys at law, duly authorized to practice law before the
courts of record in another state, while temporarily in this state on legal business. or
while permitted to conduct or argue any case in this state according to the rules of
practice of the supreme court, but no visiting attorney shall issue or indorse. as attor-
ney, any writ of any court of this state.
fd. See also REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS § 3(3) (2000) (stating that
out-of-state lawyers may provide legal services to clients "at a place within a jurisdiction in which the
lawyer is not admitted to the extent that the lawyer's activities arise out of or are otherwise reasonably
related to the lawyer's practice" in the jurisdiction where admitted). There are additional examples of
limited law practice permitting some out-of-state attorneys. See, e.g., FLA. BAR REG. R. 13-1.1
(authorizing attorneys licensed to practice law in jurisdictions other than Florida to be certified to
practice in Florida for up to one year while employed by a legal aid organization); N.M. R. Gov. AD-
MISS. BAR R. 15-303 (authorizing a law professor admitted to practice in another state but who is not a
member of the New Mexico bar to practice law to the extent necessary to supervise law students in a
clinical program at the University of New Mexico School of Law); WASH. APR 8(g) (asserting that
full-time military officers admitted to practice law in another state but not Washington may, upon
application and approval, appear and practice law before the Washington courts representing designated
active duty military personnel in most any noncriminal matter, litigation, or administrative proceeding).
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volves the practice of law by house counsel. Many employers of house
counsel, especially large corporations whose business activities extend
regionally or nationally, often find it necessary for their house attorneys to
represent them in many states. Many large corporations also fairly fre-
quently find it necessary to move the principal office base of some of their
house attorneys to a company office located in another state. These moves
may be temporary, which deters house counsel from seeking admission to
practice in the state where presently based when, as is typical, admission
may be a slow and protracted process. The result is that, unless otherwise
exempted, the incidence of violation of unauthorized practice laws by in-
house attorneys is high. However, in over one-fourth of the states, an ex-
emption from unauthorized practice laws is now available to house counsel
employed in the state who become specially certified by the state.229 To
qualify for certification, an in-house attorney must be licensed to practice
law in another state, generally must be a full-time employee of the client,
and court appearances generally are not permitted without express pro hac
vice court permission. The ABA's recent revision of Model Rule 5.5 also
expressly considers house counsel. It permits these counsel to provide
legal services to their employer in states where not admitted to practice and
the rule does not mandate special state certification.230 Both house counsel
certification and Rule 5.5 house counsel exemptions have recently been
under adoption consideration by the authorities in Connecticut. A house
229 For a listing of these SlaleS as of 2000, see Carol A. Needham, Permilling Lawyers to Partici-
pate in Multidisciplinary Practices: Business as Usual or the End ofthe Profession as We Know It?, 84
MINN. L. REv. 1315, 1356-57 (2000). The exemption in nearly all of these states is by court rule. Id.
See OR. SUP. CT. R., RULES REGULATING ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAw IN OREGON, R. 16.05 (stating
a post-2000 exemption of house counsel).
230 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5(d)(l) (2000):
(d) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or
suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services in this juris-
diction that:
(I) are provided to the lawyer's employer or its organizational affiliates and are
not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission.
ld.
The comments to Model Rule 5.5 include the following:
(16) Paragraph (d)(I) applies to a lawyer who is employed by a client to provide
legal services to the client or its organizational affiliates, i.e., entities that control, are
controlled by, or are under common control with the employer. This paragraph does
not authorize the provision of personal legal services to the employer's officers or
employees. The paragraph applies to in-house corporate lawyers, government law-
yers and others who are employed to render legal services to the employer. The
lawyer's ability to represent the employer outside the jurisdiction in which the law-
yer is licensed generally serves the interests of the employer and does not create an
unreasonable risk to the client and others because the employer is well situated to as-
sess the lawyer's qualifications and the quality of the lawyer's work.
(17) If an employed lawyer establishes an office or other systematic presence in
this jurisdiction for the purpose of rendering legal services to the employer, the law-
yer may be subject to registration or other requirements, including assessments for
client protection funds and mandatory continuing legal education.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cm!. 16-17 (2000).
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counsel certification proposal recommended by the Connecticut Bar Asso-
ciation's House of Delegates was recently rejected by the Rules Committee
of the Connecticut Superior Court but the Chief Justice of the Connecticut
Supreme Court has indicated that this rejection may later be reconsid-
ered.231
Admission on motion as a fully licensed attorney without taking a
state's regular bar examination is another possible solution to the multi-
jurisdictional practice problem, both for some house counsel and some
other lawyers. Admission on motion is available in Connecticut and many
other states to some out-of-state attorneys.232 However, admission on mo-
tion requirements are so restrictive as to who may qualify that relatively
few attorneys apply for this type of admission. Common restrictions that
limit who may qualify are a required substantial period of law practice in a
reciprocal state prior to applying for admission on motion and that the ap-
plicant must intend to practice law actively and continuously in the state
where admitted on motion.233 The restrictions do vary among the states
and some states limit this form of admission more extensively than does
Connecticut, but other states restrict less extensively.234 Some states do not
permit admission on motion as a fully licensed attorney but permit out-of-
state lawyers with extensive law practice experience to be admitted on
passing a special examination.23S Other states have no admission on mo-
231 On the rejection, see Thomas B. SchefTey, Setback/or In-House Status, CONN. LAW TRIS.,
May 19, 2003, at 3. On the possible reconsiderations, see Thomas B. SchefTey, Safe-Harbor for Unli-
censed In-Housers on Hold. CONN. LAw TRIS., Oct. 20,2003, at I (stating that Chief Justice Sullivan
said that the rejection may later be reconsidered once certain foreign trade rules concerning foreign
lawyers' rights to practice law in Connecticut and other states have been clarified and if a reciprocity
requirement is added to the right of house counsel unadmitted in Connecticut to provide legal services
in Connecticut for their employers).
232 ad' . .. C' 17 20 d .n a mISSion on motIon In onnectlcut, see supra notes - an accompanymg text.
233 See, e.g., CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 2-13 (the applicant must have practiced law in a jurisdiction
olTering reciprocal benefits and have so practiced for five of seven years immediately prior to applica-
tion for admission on motion and intends, ifadmitted on motion, to practice law actively in Connecticut
and to devote a major portion of his or her working time to such practice).
234 Some states have somewhat more extensive limitations. See, e.g., R.I. SUP. CT. R. art. II, R. 2
(an out-of-state attomey applicant for admission on motion must have actively practiced law in the state
of the applicant's admission for at least five of the last ten years and must pass the essay portion of the
Rhode Island bar examination).
Other states have less extensive limitations than those in Connecticut. See, e.g., MICH. COMPo
LAws § 600.946(3) (1996) (requiring applicants for admission on motion to have practiced law for only
three of five years immediately preceding application); MINN. R. CT., RULES FOR ADMISSION TO THE
BAR, R. 7(B) (providing for admission without further examination permitted if applicant received a
scaled score of 145 or above on the Multistate Bar Examination taken as part of and at the same time as
the written bar examination given by another jurisdiction); cf. WIS. SUP. CT. R. 40.03 (2003) (stating
that graduales of Wisconsin law schools that are fully accredited by the ABA will be admitted to the
Wisconsin bar without taking the Wisconsin bar examination).
235 E.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6062 (stating that only out-of-state lawyers who have been
active members in good standing of the bar of a sister state for at least four years prior 10 the examina-
tion may take the special examination).
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tion possibilities and no special examination for admission of out-of-state
attorneys.236 Connecticut has amended its admission on motion rule many
times.237 If and when further changes are being considered in Connecticut,
some of the admission on motion provisions adopted in other states may be
helpful models.
MDP is another type of practice in which attorneys may be engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law. In this type of practice the attorneys'
conduct may be illegal even though, as is usually the case, the attorneys are
admitted to practice law in the state where they are doing most of their
legal services work. In the most controversial form ofMDP, a nonattorney
organization makes legal services available to its clients and relies typically
on attorney employees to do much or all of the legal services work. If the
nonattorney organization is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, its
attorney employees are too, as the attorneys are assisting the organization
in violating the law. Different forms of MDP are possible and proposals
have been made legally to validate one or more of these forms, where not
currently legally permissible. No Connecticut law has expressly approved
any of the MDP options. Most of the options are set forth in the 1999 re-
port of the ABA Commission, the Commission on MDP,238 that made an
extensive study of MDP.239 The Commission describes four models of
236 E.g., N.M. CT. R. 15-201 (stating that all applicants to the New Mexico Bar must pass the
New Mexico bar exam). But attorneys from another state may be granted a nonrenewable license to
represent public defender clients or a government entity. Id. R. 15.301.1; cf OR. SUP. CT. R., RULES
REGULATING ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW IN OREGON, R. 15.05 (permitting attorneys from Idaho
and Washington to be admitted on motion in Oregon if they have had three or more years of practice
experience immediately preceding their application). This is a reciprocity rule and Idaho and Washing-
ton have similar rules. In these states, admission on motion is not permitted except pursuant to their
reciprocity exception.
237 See I HORTON & KNOX, supra note 15, at 190 (commenting following superior court rule sec-
tion 2-13).
238 American Bar Association, Commission on MOP, Report to the House of Delegates (1999),
available at http://www.abanet.orglcpr/rndprecommendation.html(last visited Nov. 13,2003) (on file
with the Connecticut Law Review).
239 Following the ABA Commission's 1999 report, a vast amount ofliterature emerged on MOP.
See, e.g., Report, Conn. Bar Ass'n, Study Committee on MOP (May 2000) CBA Multidisciplinary
Report, supra note 104; N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Special Committee on the Law Governing Firm Struc-
ture and Operation, Preserving the Core Values of the American Legal Profession. The Place ofMultid-
isciplinary Practice in the Law Governing Lawyers (April 2000), available at
http://www.law.comell.edu/ethics/mdp.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2003) (on file with the Connecticut
Law Review); Symposium, The Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice, 44 ARIZ. L. REv.
521 (2002); The Jonathan M. Ault Symposium, Professional Responsibility and Multi-Disciplinary
Practice, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 861 (2002); Symposium. The Future ofthe Profession: A Sympo-
sium on Multidisciplinary Practice, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1083 (2000); Mary C. Oaly, Choosing Wise Men
Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of Purchasing Legal Services from Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary
Partnership, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 217 (2000); John S. Ozienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidis-
ciplinary Practice and the American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery
ofLegal Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 83 (2000); Lawrence J. Fox, Old
Wine in Old Bottles: Preserving Professional Independence, 72 TEMP. L. REv. 971 (1999).
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MDP: the fully-integrated model, the command and control model, the
law-related services/ancillary business model, and the contract mode1.240
Under the fully integrated model, the most controversial of the four models
although approved by the Commission with certain provisos,241 an organi-
zation owned and controlled by nonattorneys provides its clients with both
legal and nonlegal services, and typically much or all of the legal services
work is performed by attorney employees of the firm. If a nonattorney
organization operating under this model is engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law, its attorney employees are too, as the attorneys are assist-
ing the organization in the unauthorized practice oflaw.242 Under the three
other models a law firm shares in the benefits of MDP by developing a
special nonemployee relationship with one or more nonattorney providers
oflegal services. The relationship may be a partnership,243 ownership,244 or
a contractual relationship.24S
240 See ABA, COMM'N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELE·
GATES, app. C (Aug. 1999) [hereinafter ABA COMM'N ON MOP], available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpappendixc.html (last visited Oct. 14,2003) (on file with the Connecticut
law Review). The four models are also described in an article by the reporter for the Commission. See
Daly, supra note 239, at 224-225. See also 10hn S. Ozienkowski & Robert 1. Peroni, supra note 239, at
153-74.
The Commission also notes a fifth model, the cooperative model, based on law firm or client em-
ployment or retention of nonattomeys to provide services under direct supervision of the law firm's
attorneys. ABA COMM'N ON MOP, supra, at app. C. This is permissible in most states but the Com-
mission report states that it is not MOP by the Commission's definition of that term. ld.
For a different categorization of MOP operations, see Bryant G. Garth & Carole Silver, The MDP
Challenge in the Context ofGlobalization, 52 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 903,910-917 (2002) (categorizing
MOP operations as "captive law firms", "stealth MOPs", and "formal referral relationships").
241 On Commission approval, see ABA COMM'N ON MOP, supra note 240, available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpfinalrep2oo0.html(last visited Oct. 14, 2003) (on file with the Con-
necticut Law Review); cf Daly, supra note 239, at 226 & 273.
242 Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5(b) (2000), with MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5(a) (2003) (before and after 2002 revision). One or the other of these versions
of Model Rule 5.5 is currently in effect in nearly all states.
243 Under the command and control model, nonattorneys as well as attorneys may be partners in
the law firm and both attorney and nonattomey partners may share legal fees. ABA COMM'N ON MOP,
supra note 240, at app. C. This model is permitted in the District of Columbia. D.C. RULES OF
PROF'L. CONDUCT R. 5.4. But the partnership must have as its sole purpose providing legal services to
clients. Id. at R. 5.4(b)(I).
244 Under the law-related services/ancillary business model, the law firm operates an ancillary
subsidiary organization that is partly owned and controlled by the law firm's partners. ABA COMM'N
ON MOP, supra note 240. This model, with certain limitations, is permitted by ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 5.7, a rule that has not been adopted in Connecticut, although in the same
or similar form, it has been adopted in a few other states. For states that have adopted Rule 5.7, see
STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY O. StMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 368-69
(2003). For a listing of large law firms in the United States operating ancillary businesses, many of
them in states that have not adopted Model Rule 5.7, see Lowell 1. Noteboom, Professions in Conver-
gence: Taking the Next Step, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1359,1365-74 (2000).
24S Under the contract model, a law firm creates a long-term contract affiliation with an inde-
pendent professional services firm engaged in providing nonlegal services and in which neither the law
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MOP is a highly contentious issue, especially the fully-integrated
model of MOP. What makes the issue more difficult and troublesome is
that it is quite apparent that many nonattorney organizations and their at-
torneys, most particularly the larger accounting firms and their attorney
employees, operating under the fully-integrated model, are regularly and
extensively involved in providing legal service work to others, much of
which no doubt violates existing unauthorized practice laws. This unau-
thorized practice activity by MOPs occurs in all states but apparently is
most prevalent in states with very large urban centers. The pro-MOP pro-
posals of the ABA Commission on MOP generated great concern nation-
ally within the bar everywhere in this country. The controversy subsided
after the ABA House of Delegates in 2002 rejected its Commission's pro-
posals, and it subsided still more following the Enron and similar scandals
involving big accounting firms. But market pressures for MOP remain
strong, with resulting intense competitive pressures on private law firms
from nonattorneys and their organizations that are or will be providing
legal services to others. The competitive pressure is not only on the big
private law firms but can readily extend to medium and small private law
firms as well. Lawmaking bodies in Connecticut and the other states
sooner or later are going to find it necessary to face up to the MOP issue,
consider the arguments for and against it, and decide if they are going to
legally validate some or all forms of MOP. If existing legal restrictions on
fully-integrated MOP are eliminated, the result could be a drastic restruc-
turing of the legal profession with very negative consequences for the legal
order in this country, Connecticut included.
m. CONCLUSIONS
Unauthorized practice laws are essential to our legal system as in major
respects they determine who mayor may not practice law or otherwise
provide legal services to the provider or others. These laws also constitute
a separate and complex body of law, with many subtleties and shadings.
This complexity is inevitable given the variety of possible legal services,
the wide range of possible legal service providers, the differences in com-
petency and trustworthiness of available legal service providers, and the
diverse legal service needs of the many different kinds ofconsumer groups.
Adding to the complexity is that unauthorized practice law is predomi-
nantly a field of state law, rather than federal law, and there are extensive
finn nor its partners have an ownership interest. Pursuant to the contract, the two firms may refer
matters to one another, the law finn agrees to purchase goods and services from the professional ser-
vices firm, and the law finn advertises the relationship. See ABA COMM'N ON MOP, supra note 240,
at app. C. The law of no state explicitly validates the contract model but some commentators claim that
a limited version of the model is pennissible under the current rules of professional conduct. See
Ozienkowski & Peroni, supra note 239, at 164.
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variations among the states in the scope and detail of their unauthorized
practice laws. These variations among the states are causing additional
complications in unauthorized practice laws as the geographically expand-
ing economy is resulting in more legal problems that need multijurisdic-
tionallegal services.
Connecticut's unauthorized practice laws are a patchwork of statutes,
court rules, caselaw, and executive agency regulations, but with extensive
voids and many ambiguities and uncertainties. Among the many serious
uncertainties is the scope of the state courts' constitutional power over un-
authorized practice matters and whether the courts have ultimate constitu-
tional power over such matters when their determinations are not in accord
with the state's statutes or executive agency regulations.246
A highly important and very troublesome aspect of Connecticut unau-
thorized practice laws is the extensive lack of compliance with these laws.
The prevalence of noncompliance is unusual for a field of law as important
as this one. Many of the unauthorized practice violations are of laws that
are quite clear; others are somewhat questionable given the ambiguity in
the relevant laws. The high incidence of violations are obvious indications
that reforms in these laws are needed, eliminating the more serious ambi-
guities and perhaps easing, or even tightening, some existing legal restric-
tions.
There are many possible options available to Connecticut lawmakers
for reforming Connecticut unauthorized practice laws.247 This article pro-
vides a large sampling of such options. The state's courts and the state
legislature are primarily responsible for making reforms in the state's unau-
thorized practice laws and arguably the courts are best qualified to make
many of the changes. Comprehensive reforms by the state's lawmakers are
needed. Action is long overdue.
246 See supra discussion Pan I.F.
247 See supra discussion Part II.
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